Acts of Hashem in Mishlei

Originally published on my (now defunct) Mishlei blog in August 2012. I will note that my understanding of hashgachah pratis has evolved significantly since then - mostly due to the influence of Sefer Iyov. Nevertheless, I have chosen not to "update" the frame of reference in this blog post. 

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Acts of Hashem in Mishlei

Introduction

This is intended to serve as a peremptory methodology post on a point that is bound to come up in future Mishlei posts. Rather than explain myself in each individual post, I'd rather be able to link to a full treatment of the subject. 

The methodology principle may be stated as follows: When Shlomo ha'Melech uses the term "Hashem" in Mishlei, he is usually referring to the laws of nature - not hashgachah pratis (individual providence or divine intervention).

I will now expand upon the basis for this principle and cite support from two Rishonim. 

The Purpose and Scope of Mishlei

Different meforshim have different views as to what Mishlei is about. According to Rashi [1] the purpose of Mishlei is "to teach people that they should toil in Torah." Consequently, Rashi interprets many pesukim to be about learning Torah and keeping mitzvos. Ralbag [2] holds that the purpose of Mishlei is "to guide man to intellectual and social success." Therefore, he interprets the pesukim as teaching strategies towards those two ends. The Vilna Gaon [3] learns that Mishlei is essentially a strategy guide on how to wage war against the yetzer ha'ra.

My own approach to Mishlei follows that of Saadia Gaon, as set forth in the introduction to his commentary on Mishlei (and as I explained in my translation and commentary on the first section of that introduction). According to Saadia Gaon Mishlei is a book about how to make intelligent decisions in everyday life - decisions which yield the greatest long-term pleasure with the least long-term pain. 

Since, according to this view, Mishlei is about everyday decision-making, it follows that the overwhelming focus of the sefer will be on how to obtain benefits and avoid harmful consequences within the laws of nature - as opposed to the benefits and consequences which emanate from hashgachah pratis (e.g. berachos and klalos, nissim and hashgachic onesh, tefilah, nevuah etc.). Although these areas of hashgachah pratis are certainly important to learn about, they are too far removed from the everyday decision-making of most people to be included in a practical book like Mishlei. The treatment of these subjects can be found in Sefer Tehilim, Sefer Iyov, and most of the other books of Nach.

This does not mean that Mishlei never talks about hashgachah pratis. On occasion, Shlomo ha'Melech deals with such topics, but only in order to teach practical ideas about decision-making in everyday life.

Acts of Hashem in Mishlei

When we see a pasuk which ascribes a certain act to Hashem in other contexts, our first inclination is often to assume it is talking about an act of hashgachah pratis. For instance, "I am Hashem, your God, Who has taken you out of the land of Egypt, from the house of slavery" (Shemos 20:2) is referring to the miracles and wonders of the Exodus from Egypt. "The meat was still between their teeth, not yet chewed, when the wrath of Hashem flared against the people, and Hashem struck a very mighty blow against the people" (Bamidbar 11:33) refers to Hashem miraculously smiting those who complained about the mahn. "The Lord consumed without pity all the dwellings of Jacob; in His anger He razed the fortresses of the daughter of Yehudah to the ground" (Eichah 2:2) refers to the destruction of Yerushalayim wrought by Hashem as a result of our iniquities. And so on.

There are a number of instances in Mishlei in which Hashem is described as acting to benefit the chacham or tzadik and to bring harm upon the fool or rasha. For instance: "Hashem will not starve the soul of the righteous, but the destructiveness of the wicked will batter them" (10:3), "Hashem will uproot the house of the arrogant, but He upholds the boundary of a widow" (15:25), "Like streams of water is the heart of a king in the hand of Hashem; wherever He wishes, so He directs it" (21:1). Instances of this sort aren't super prevalent in Mishlei, but they occur frequently enough not to be regarded as an anomaly.

If, according to Saadia Gaon, Mishlei is about practical decision-making based on natural consequences, how are we to understand these "acts of God pesukim" which would seem to imply Divine intervention?

This is why, based on Saadia Gaon's approach, it would make sense to interpret these pesukim as referring to cause-and-effect within the laws of nature - that is, Hashem's actions in the middas ha'din (strict justice mode) of the Boreh Olam (Creator of the universe), rather than the middas ha'rachamim (merciful mode) of the Mashgiach ha'Pratim (Supervisor of individuals).

This was how my Mishlei rebbi interpreted references to Hashem in Mishlei. When I was first learning his derech I didn't really question this premise. It wasn't until later that I began to wonder whether there was any precedent in the meforshim for this approach. The more I saw how often the other meforshim explained pesukim like these to be referring to hashgachah pratis, the more

Then I found the Meiri.

Meiri: Non-hashgachic Interpretation of a Seemingly Hashgachic Pasuk

The Meiri's commentary was the first place I saw this methodology principle stated in explicit terms. As noted above, the pasuk: "Hashem will not starve the soul of the righteous, but the destructiveness of the wicked will batter them" (Mishlei 10:3) seems to be referring to hashgachah pratis. It is reminiscent of the pasuk we recite after the Birkas ha'Mazon: "I have been a youth and also aged, but I have not seen a tzadik forsaken, nor his children begging for bread" (Tehilim 37:25). Pesukim like these would seem to imply that there is a special hashgachah on the tzadik, and that Hashem will protect him from starvation.

The Meiri takes a different approach. He interprets the pasuk in an entirely naturalistic manner. According to the Meiri, the subject of the pasuk is the difference between the eating habits of tzadikim and reshaim. He explains that the tzadik eats in moderation, based on his physical and psychological needs. Consequently, his chomer (material body and psyche) will be more receptive to the development of his tzurah (intellect). In contrast, the rasha eats in quantities which are either excessive or insufficient. This leads to a physical and psychological imbalance, which in turn, has a detrimental effect not only on his intellectual development, but on his capacity for psychological satisfaction.

Upon reading the Meiri's naturalistic interpretation, one might object, saying: "Then what does the pasuk mean when it says, 'Hashem will not starve the soul of the tzadik'? Doesn't this imply hashgachah pratis - that Hashem intervenes to prevent the tzadik from starving?" The Meiri [4] answers this question in his commentary:

This matter is ascribed to Hashem, for all things that come about through nature are ascribed to Him, blessed is He. It is as if it the pasuk said, “The tzadik will not be in a state of starvation,” and the rasha will be the opposite, and will never be satisfied, as it is stated, “the belly of the wicked will lack” (Mishlei 13:25).

Simple as that. According to the Meiri, any effect which is brought about by the laws of nature can be described as being brought about by Hashem. The Meiri learns that the tzadik's non-starvation is the result of his own actions, based on the design of the human body. Nevertheless, the pasuk ascribes this result to Hashem - as though it were directly caused by Him. The Meiri even goes so far as to suggest that the pasuk could have omitted mention of Hashem entirely, without losing anything from the main idea.

Rambam: Hashem Guides Sinners on the Path

The first time I noticed the application of this principle in the works of the Rambam was in the section of Hilchos Teshuvah which deals with free will. Chapter 5 of Hilchos Teshuvah is about the fundamental principle of free will, and Chapter 6 is devoted to addressing pesukim in Tanach which appear to undermine that principle.

The Rambam [5] cites the following two pesukim from Tehilim as examples of statements which seem to imply that Hashem interferes with free will: "Good and upright is Hashem; therefore He guides sinners on the path. He leads the humble with justice and teaches His way to the humble" (Tehilim 25:7-8). What does it mean that Hashem "guides sinners on the way" and "leads the humble with justice etc."? Does this imply that Hashem interferes with their free will? Nope. The Rambam explains:

This means that Hashem has sent prophets to them, who teach them the ways of Hashem and help them to return in teshuvah. Moreover, He instilled within them the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them. This is what the Sages meant by "ha'ba l'taher, mesayin oso" ("one who comes to be purified is assisted") - in other words, he will find himself assisted in the matter [by the aforementioned natural tendency].

Here again we have a pasuk which, on the surface, appears to be describing a direct interaction between Hashem and human beings - and yet, the Rambam interprets this as referring to natural phenomena (i.e. the nature of man). Even more shocking is the Rambam's treatment of that well-known statement of Chazal. Contrary to appearances, "ha'ba l'taher, mesayin oso" is not referring to hashgachic assistance. It is referring to the way that Hashem designed man, that the more he pursues chochmah and tzedek, the more he is drawn to them.

But all of this is nothing compared to the most eye-opening source yet: the Rambam, in the Guide for the Perplexed.

Rambam: On Ascribing Actions to Hashem

In the final chapter of Book II of the Moreh ha'Nevuchim, the Rambam [6] provides a key which unlocks a whole new level of understanding of maasei Hashem (Divine actions) in Tanach. I will quote the chapter in full, with my underlining for emphasis:

It is clear that everything that is produced must have an immediate cause which produced it, and that cause must have a cause, and so on, until the First Cause – namely, the will and desire of God – is reached. Therefore, the prophets sometimes omit mention of the intermediate causes and ascribe the production of a particular thing directly to God, saying that God has made it [or did it]. This is well-known and we, as well as other men of truth, have already explained it; it is the belief of all adherents of our Torah.

After having heard this remark, listen to what I will explain in this chapter; direct your special attention to it more than you have done to the other chapters of this part. It is this:

Know that regarding the immediate causes of things produced, it makes no difference whether these causes are natural and essential, or of free will, or of chance; by “free will” I mean that of man, or even in the will of another living creature. In all of these cases the prophets ascribe the production directly to God and use such phrases as God has made [or done] it, commanded it, or said it. In all such cases the verbs “to say,” “to speak,” “to command,” “to call” and “to send” are employed. This is what I desired to state in this chapter is this, namely, that according to the hypothesis and theory accepted, it is God Who caused that will to arise in that dumb animal, and He is the One Who necessitated free will for the human being, and He is the One Who guided natural things in accordance with their patterns; and as chance occurrences are part of the good in the natural [order], as has been explained [by Aristotle], and are mostly the result of the combined action of nature, free will, and desire, it can consequently be said of everything which is produced by any of these causes, that God commanded that it should be made [or done], or said that it should be so. I will give you instances, and they will guide you in the interpretation of passages which I do not mention.

As regards phenomena produced regularly by natural causes, such as the melting of the snow when the atmosphere becomes warm and the roaring of the sea when a storm rages [I quote the following passages:] “He issues His command it melts them” (Tehilim 147:18); “He spoke and raised the stormy wind and lifted its waves” (ibid. 107:25); in reference to the rain we read: “I will command the clouds that they shall not rain etc.” (Yeshaya 5:6). 

Events caused by man’s free will, such as war, the dominion of one nation over another, the attempt of one person to hurt another, or to curse him, [are ascribed to God as well;] in reference to the dominion of Nebuchadnezzar and his host: “I have commended my holy ones, also I have called my heroes for my anger” (ibid. 13:3) and “I will send him against a hypocrite nation” (ibid. 10:6); in reference to Shimi ben Gera: “For God said to him, ‘Curse David’” (Shmuel II 16:10); in reference to the deliverance of the righteous Yosef from prison: “He sent a king who released him” (Tehilim 105:20); in reference to the victory of the Persians over the Chaldeans: “I shall send foreigners to Bavel, who will scatter it and empty it” (Yirmiyahu 51:2); in reference to the providing of food to Eliyahu: “Behold, I have commanded a widow to sustain you there” (Melachim I 17:5); and the righteous Yosef said: “It was not you who sent me here, but God” (Bereishis 45:8). 

[The attribution to God of] that which is caused by the will of an animal or its movement towards its needs [may be illustrated by the following instance]: “Then Hashem spoke to the fish [and it spewed out Jonah onto dry land]” (Yonah 2:11); the act is ascribed to God because He gave the fish the will, and not because He made it a prophet or showed it a prophetic vision. Similarly it is said of the locusts that appeared in the days of Yoel ben Petuel: “for those who carry out His word are mighty” (Yoel 2:11); or of the beasts that took possession of the land of Edom when destroyed in the days of Sancheriv: “He cast lots for them, and His hand has distributed [the land] for them with a [measuring] wire” (Yeshaya 34:17). Although here the verbs “to say,” “to command,” “to send” are not used, the meaning is evidently the same, and you must explain all passages that are analogous to it in a similar manner.

This must also be said with regards to events which evidently occur by chance, for example, in reference to Rivka, “and let her be a wife to your master’s son as Hashem has spoken” (Bereishis 24:51); in reference to David and Yehonasan: “go, for Hashem has sent you away” (Shmuel I 20:22); in reference to Yosef: “God sent me before you” (Bereishis 45:7). 

You see clearly that the providing of a cause, in whatever manner this may take place – by nature, chance, free will, or will – is always expressed by one of the five terms: commanding, saying, speaking, sending, or calling. Note this, and apply it everywhere according to the context. Many difficulties will thereby be removed, and passages apparently containing things far from truth will prove to be true.

There you have it. Anything that is produced by nature, chance, free will, or animal will - and certainly, anything brought about by hashgachah pratis - will be described in Tanach as though it was directly caused by Hashem. [7]

Philosophically speaking, this makes perfect sense, insofar as Hashem is the First Cause. What I found to be so shocking was the far-reaching implications of this interpretive principle, as the Rambam himself alluded to by saying that by applying this principle, "many difficulties will thereby be removed, and passages apparently containing things far from the truth will prove to be true."

We see from the Rambam's interpretation of "ha'ba l'taher mesayin oso" that Chazal's statements may be understood in this way as well. This confirms what I already suspected (and employed in my learning for years).

Conclusion

This post was intended to be about how to learn pesukim in Mishlei which refer to Hashem's actions, but ended up taking us far beyond that. I hope that at the very least I have adequately shown the basis of my general approach to such pesukim in Mishlei.

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 1:2
[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershoom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Mishlei: Introduction (note: the Ralbag's introduction is not typically found in the published Mikraos Gedolos)
[3] HaRav Eliyahu Kramer (Vilna Gaon), Commentary on Sefer Mishlei (I don't remember where and I currently do not know where my edition of the Vilna Gaon's commentary on Mishlei is hiding)
[4] Rabbeinu Menachem ha'Meiri, Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 10:3
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4
[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 2:48
[7] I am bothered by the fact that the Rambam concludes by saying that there are five terms which indicate this idea: commanding, saying, speaking, sending, or calling - yet, it seems that this principle is applied to other cases in which actions are ascribed to Hashem without using these five terms.