Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 2: Approach #1)

In Part 1 we raised the question of why the Torah only forbids us to work a Jewish slave with avodas parech but not a non-Jewish slave. Part 2 explores one of three approaches.

May 27, 2024

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Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 2: Approach #1)

Click here to read Part 1.

Three Approaches

I thought these were powerful questions. To my shock, I have not found a single explicit answer in the writings of Chazal, the Rishonim, or the Acharonim.

Nevertheless, I have three approaches that I’d like to share. These correspond to the three logical possibilities:

Avodas parech is inherently wrong from an ethical standpoint, but there’s a reason why the Torah limits the prohibition to Jewish slaves.
Avodas parech is not inherently wrong, but is only wrong when done to Jews.
Avodas parech isn’t ethically wrong at all, but is prohibited for philosophical reasons which only pertain to an eved Ivri.

We will explore these approaches one at a time. Even if you don’t agree with a particular explanation, I believe there is value in the approaches themselves, insofar as the methodology of taamei ha’mitzvos (analysis of the reasons for the commandments) is concerned.

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Approach #1: The Torah’s Double Standard in Ethical Legislation

The first approach requires us to address a larger question: Why does the Torah have double standards in so many other mishpatim (mitzvos which promote justice and righteousness in society)? Certain mishpatim apply across the board: it is forbidden to murder any human being, whether a Jew or a non-Jew, “for He made man b’tzelem Elokim (in the Divine form)” (Bereishis 9:6); it is forbidden to steal from a Jew and from a non-Jew; it is forbidden to rob a Jew or a non-Jew. But most mishpatim only regulate our interactions with fellow Jews: “do not go as a gossipmonger among your people” (Vayikra 19:16), “do not hate your brother in your heart” (ibid. 19:17), “you shall rebuke a member of your people” (ibid.), “do not take revenge or bear a grudge against the children of your people” (ibid. 19:18), “you shall love your fellow as yourself” (ibid. 19:18), and many more. Shouldn’t these ethical standards be universal as well? Why differentiate?

The answer, in a word, is pragmatism. The Torah legislates in-group ethics because this is the most effective route to the Torah’s ultimate objective of establishing universalist ethics among all mankind.

The Torah’s ethics are universalist in nature. This is why Hashem chose Avraham Avinu, as the Torah explicitly states: “I have chosen him so that he will charge his children and household after him, that they will keep the derech Hashem (way of Hashem) to do tzedakah (righteousness) and mishpat (justice)” (Bereishis 18:19) – that is, tzedakah and mishpat for all human beings. This is clear from the context of the aforementioned verse, in which Hashem responds to Avraham’s concern about the possibility of divine injustice towards the citizens of Sedom and Amorah. The Torah’s goal is to extend the derech Hashem of tzedakah and mishpat to all of humanity – that all humans should practice “love thy neighbor as thyself,” to not speak lashon ha’ra against any human being, to not be vengeful towards anyone, etc. But to legislate this universalist ideal would be unrealistic.

Consider an analogy from parenting. Every parent wants their child to acquire the virtue of generosity and to practice the behavior of sharing. How do they go about instilling this value? By capitalizing on the child’s natural affinities: by urging their child to share their toys with their siblings, or to split their candy with their friend, or to take turns with the neighbor at the local playground. They do not, at the outset, compel their toddler to share and practice generosity equally and indiscriminately with all children: forcing them to give their toys to random orphans, or send their candy to kids in Africa, or join the local children’s communist chapter.

Why not? Shouldn’t generosity know no bounds? Shouldn’t we teach our children to be generous to all those in need? The answer is: yes, but that’s not how one instills these virtues in a self-centered, immature, emotional being. Instead, one promotes and enforces the young child’s generosity towards family, friends, and neighbors until these behaviors and their corresponding character traits take root. At that point, under the right kind of guidance, these virtues will flourish and radiate outwards in ever-widening circles of compassion towards all.

This is how the Torah operates. The most baseline moral standards are legislated universally, but most mishpatim only govern the interrelationships between Jews. If the Torah were to impose universal ethical standards on Israel by force of law, these standards would not be upheld, and would likely backfire. Natural affinity and in-group favoritism are strong among Jews today, but were even stronger in the ancient Near East, where tribalism and xenophobia reigned supreme. Instead of attempting to oppose these feelings of in-group preference, the Torah harnesses them by making them into the foundation of the tzedakah and mishpat in our nation. Once these values and behaviors become entrenched through legislation, the middos (character traits) they promote will, if properly guided by the Torah’s teachings, naturally evolve toward universalism.

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This, I submit, is why the Torah only prohibits avodas parech for an eved Ivri – not because it is ethically acceptable to mistreat an eved Canaani, but because the Torah’s general approach is to legislate ethical behavior at home before extending it to the world at large. I believe my answer is supported by the Rambam’s codification. He does not simply state, “It is permissible to work a non-Jewish slave b’farech,” and end there. Such a formulation would have been sufficient if the halachos of avodas parech did not aim at any larger ethical objectives. Rather, the Rambam concludes the laws of eved Canaani as follows (Hilchos Avadim 9:8):

It is permissible to work a non-Jewish slave b’farech. Even though this is the law, the middas chasidus (conduct of kindness) and darchei ha’chochmah (ways of wisdom) [dictate] that one should be a merciful person who pursues righteousness; he should not make heavy the yoke upon his servant nor should he afflict him, and he should feed him and give him to drink from all of his food and beverages.
The Early Sages would give to their servants from each and every cooked dish they ate, and they would prioritize the sustenance of their animals and their slaves before their own meal, for it is stated, “Like the eyes of servants towards the hand of their masters, like the eyes of a maidservant towards the hand of her mistress” (Tehilim 123:2).
Likewise, one should not degrade [his non-Jewish slave] physically or verbally, for Scripture gave them to you for service – not for shame. One should not shout and rage at him excessively but should speak with him gently and listen to his grievances. Likewise, it is explicitly stated about the good ways of Iyov with which he praised himself: “Did I despise the justice of my servant or the case of my maidservant … did not his Maker make me, and we were prepared in one womb?” (Iyov 31:13,15)
Cruelty and brazenness are only found among the uncircumcised non-Jews, but the seed of Avraham Avinu – namely, the Jews, to whom Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu bestowed the good of the Torah and commanded them in righteous decrees and judgments – they are merciful to all. Likewise, of the middos of Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu which we are commanded to emulate, it is said, “He is merciful to all His creations” (Tehilim 145:9). Anyone who is merciful will receive mercy, as it is stated, “I shall give you mercy and you shall be merciful, and multiply” (Devarim 13:18).

It is clear from the Rambam (a) that although we are allowed to work an eved Canaani with avodas parech, we are discouraged from doing so for ethical reasons; (b) these ethical reasons are universal in nature, stemming from a recognition that “his Maker made me, and we were prepared in the same womb,” and from the fact that God’s mercy is universal, for “He is merciful to all His creations”; (c) the Rambam uses in-group rhetoric to argue for universalist mercy, accusing those who are cruel to their non-Jewish servants of acting like non-Jews, and asserting that the welfare of Jewry is contingent on our practice of mercy towards all.

Thus concludes the first of my three approaches to answering our questions. In the next installment, I will argue that avodas parech is not inherently wrong, but only wrong when practiced towards Jews, and in the final installment, I will argue that avodas parech is not ethically wrong at all, but is prohibited for philosophical reasons. Stay tuned!

What do you think of Approach #1? Can you anticipate Approaches #2 and #3?

The Rabbi Schneeweiss Substack

Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 2: Approach #1)

In Part 1 we raised the question of why the Torah only forbids us to work a Jewish slave with avodas parech but not a non-Jewish slave. Part 2 explores one of three approaches.

Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 2: Approach #1)

Three Approaches

Approach #1: The Torah’s Double Standard in Ethical Legislation

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