Mishlei 17:15 - Making Exceptions to Justice

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Artwork: Vindicate, by Igor Kieryluk

Mishlei 17:15 - Making Exceptions to Justice


משלי יז:טומַצְדִּיק רָשָׁע וּמַרְשִׁיעַ צַדִּיק, תּוֹעֲבַת יְיָ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם:
Mishlei 17:15
One who treats a rasha as a tzadik and one who treats a tzadik as a rasha – both are an abomination to Hashem.
There are four major questions on this pasuk: 

(1) What are the definitions of “tzadik” (righteous person) and “rasha” (evil person) in this context? Even if we have “working definitions” of how these terms are often used in Mishlei, it’s an important methodological step to not just plug these definitions in without thinking, especially because Sefer Mishlei itself uses general terms like this in different ways. The most advisable course is to think about these terms in as fresh and unprejudiced of a way as possible within the context of the pasuk. If this approach is unfruitful, or if one is pressed for time, then it is acceptable to plug in preconceived definitions.  

(2) What does it mean to “treat a rasha as a tzadik” or “treat a tzadik as a rasha”? The Hebrew phrases are “matzdik rasha” and “marshia tzadik.” I’ve tried to preserve the ambiguity of the Hebrew as much as possible. Alternative translations of “matzdik” include “vindicate,” “justify,” and “behave righteously with.” The term “marshia” can be translated as “vilify,” “mistreat,” and “behave wickedly with,” and more. How should we translate these terms in this context?  

(3) What is meant by “an abomination to Hashem”? Both “toeivah” and “toavas Hashem” are loaded terms which are used in different ways throughout Mishlei, and certainly throughout Tanach. What does this phrase mean here?  

(4) What is the “abomination” that is common to these two cases? On the surface, the case of “one who treats a rasha as a tzadik” is quite different from the case of “one who treats a tzadik as a rasha.” It can be argued that the former is worse of a crime than the latter, insofar as it will tend to result in greater harm. Yet, our pasuk equates these cases by characterizing them both as “an abomination to Hashem.” What do these two perversions of justice have in common? One cannot simply answer, “they are both unjust.” While this may be true, it fails to explain our pasuk in a manner that enhances our practical decision-making, which is the foundation of our approach to Mishlei. 

[Okay - time to think! Read on when ready.] 

This time around I’m going to follow the Ralbag’s style of commentary by first defining the terms in the pasuk (beur ha’milos) and only afterwards explaining the ideas (beur ha’devarim). In other words, I will answer Questions #1, 2 and #3 by explaining what our pasuk means by tzadik, rasha, matzdik, marshia, and “abomination to Hashem.” 

I think the most straightforward answer to Questions #1 and 2 is that our pasuk is not referring to tzadik and rasha as types of people or archetypal Mishlei personalities. Rather, these terms are being employed in a juridical sense. “Tzadik” means “tzadik ba’din,” one who is innocent vis a vis a particular law, and “rasha” means “rasha ba’din,” one who is guilty of violating a particular law. Similarly, the term “matzdik” should be translated as “vindicate” or “exonerate” and “marshia” should be translated as “incriminate” or “convict.” The Torah itself uses these terms in this way (see, for example, Shemos 23:7 and Devarim 25:2), and the Ralbag takes this approach in our pasuk. Accordingly, our pasuk ought to be translated as follows: 

One who vindicates the guilty and one who incriminates the innocent – both are an abomination to Hashem. 

Question #3 is dicey. I do have a theory about how the term “toeivah” is used in Tanach, but I don’t think it’s necessary to delve that deeply into the term in order to explain how it’s used in our pasuk. It is sufficient to say that “abomination to Hashem” is a hyperbolic anthropomorphism intended to stigmatize the act(s) in question, usually because the behavior is one that people tend to rationalize. It is for this reason that the term “abomination” is employed in different situations for wildly different and unrelated reasons. The use of this term doesn’t tell us anything specific about of the behaviors or phenomena to which it is applied. Indeed, it ought to be viewed as more of a prescriptive than a descriptive adjective. It essentially conveys the message, “Stay away from this, no matter how good of a reason you think you have for engaging in it.” 

Having defined the terms, here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea of this pasuk: 

People have an intuitive sense of punitive justice which can be summed up as: “those who violate the law should be punished, and those who do not violate the law should not be punished.” In any system, particular cases will arise in which those who are responsible for adjudicating or enforcing the law will be tempted to pardon those who violate the law or punish those who adhere to the law; for example, a teacher might excuse a violator in order to “give him a second chance,” or might punish an entire class in order to put social pressure on the wrongdoer. The practical lesson of this pasuk is that no matter how reasonable and justifiable these exceptional cases may be, they will be perceived by the members of the system as undermining justice; this, in turn, will cause their overall commitment to justice – or at least, to the rules of that system – to weaken and deteriorate. Thus, whenever a judge or a law enforcer is tempted to make one of these two exceptions to justice, he should consider the detrimental ripple effect of his decision on the system as a whole. 

To be clear: “one who vindicates the guilty” and “one who convicts the innocent” are not the same. There are differences between these two cases – but the subject of our pasuk is what they have in common, not how they differ. 

Likewise, our pasuk does not mean to suggest that such exceptions to justice should never be made. Sometimes those who are guilty of violating a law should be vindicated, and maybe there are even cases in which those who are innocent should receive a punishment. Nevertheless, like almost all pesukim in Mishlei, this pasuk is speaking of the majority of situations. Generally speaking, it is unwise to vindicate the guilty and incriminate the innocent, and before an adjudicator or law enforcer decides to make an exception, he or she must assess the decision through the framework provided by our pasuk, asking: “If I make this exception, what will be the impact on the relationship of these people to justice in general, or to this system in particular?” 

For example, I am a classroom teacher. The students in my classes are subject to clearly delineated policies, rules, and obligations. One such policy is that if a homework assignment is submitted after the deadline, then the maximum number of points that can be earned on the assignment is capped at 80% (e.g. an assignment worth 10 points would only earn 8 points, even if it were flawless). Students are informed of this policy at the beginning of the year, and are reminded throughout. 

Now, there are many cases in which I feel compelled to make an exception to my own rule. Sometimes a student really does have a valid excuse, or just really needs to be cut some slack. However, I know that if I did allow myself to make such exceptions, that would harm my students’ relationship to the system of my class in the long-run. Other students might feel that my decision to waive the point deduction for their classmate was unfair, which in turn, might lead these students to be lax in submitting their own assignments, either because they hope I will excuse their lateness like I did for their classmate, or because they know that they needn’t take my rules seriously, since even I – the teacher who authored those rules – apparently do not take them seriously. This harm in this deterioration of “classroom justice” is evident. 

Similarly, the student who was the recipient of this exemption will also be inclined to repeat the offense. She will be more willing to turn in a late assignment, falling back on the hope (either consciously or unconsciously) that she might receive another exemption. Because this will lead to homework laxity, it is harmful for the student’s learning. 

Even my relationship as a teacher to my own system of rules will suffer if I make such exceptions. If I cave in and make an exception for one student, it will become that much easier for me to rationalize making other exceptions in other cases, even in cases where exceptions are not warranted. I would think to myself, “Well, it’s not fair that I made an exception for this student and not this other one, so even though the latter doesn’t really deserve it, I have to be fair.” Even worse, my decision whether to grant such exemptions may be influenced by subjective factors (e.g. being lenient with my favorite students and strict with the others). This, too, would be detrimental to the classroom system. 

But as I mentioned, there are ways to allow for merciful exceptions without jeopardizing the system as a whole. For example, another policy of mine is that that every student gets one “freebie” per year – that is, one instance of submitting a late assignment without any point deductions for lateness. Similarly, I have another policy that if a student knows she will not be able to complete an assignment on a given night (e.g. she is sick, there is an emergency, she forgot her books at school, etc.) then as long as she emails me to ask for an extension before the deadline, then I will grant her an extension without penalty. 

By incorporating these two “exception to the rule” rules into my class policies, I am allowing the space to make exceptions in a manner which will not be perceived as unfair by my students, and will not endanger the integrity of the system. If a student fails to complete an assignment on time because she was sick but she didn’t email me ahead of time and she already used up her freebie, then she will accept her 20% deduction as fair because she knows that it was her responsibility to email me before the deadline, and since she didn’t, then the loss of points is on her, not on me. And if a classmate of hers also neglected to hand in her assignment but didn’t receive a penalty because she emailed me ahead of time to ask for an extension, then my waiving of the second student’s lateness deduction will not be perceived by the first student as arbitrary or unfair because she knows that the second student followed the procedure. 

The reason why I have gone on at length with this real-world example is to illustrate how Mishlei is not giving practical rules for decision-making, which must be rigidly implemented in every situation. Rather, Mishlei is providing practical advice to consider when making decisions, and the chacham will factor in this advice, but will ultimately make his own decision using Mishleic thinking, rather than blindly applying the pasuk to every case it covers. 

In other words, don’t make the mistake of converting Mishlei pesukim into rules. Mishlei is a decision-making guide – not a halacha sefer.