My Babylonian Zionism (and Why It Keeps Me in Far Rockaway)

People have asked me what my personal stance on Zionism is. My answer is too personal and too controversial to share publicly, but now that I have access to a paywall, I can write about it!

The Torah content for the month of July has been sponsored by the Richmond, VA learning community, “with appreciation for Rabbi Schneeweiss’s stimulation of learning, thinking, and discussion in Torah during his scholar-in-residence Shabbos this past June.” Thank YOU, Richmond, for your warmth, your curiosity, and your love of Torah! I'm already excited for my next visit!

If this flag doesn’t make sense to you, Google “Babylonian flag” and thank Roblox.

Note: This is one of the first topics I wrote about on my old blog, way back in May 2007. This article is so entirely different from that one that I can’t even call it “an updated version.” But if you’re a long-time reader, and this rings a bell, that’s probably why.

Also, in case you were wondering, the irony is not lost on me that I’m publishing this article during the Three Weeks. The argument can be made that the timing is most appropriate.

For a printer-friendly version of this PAID subscription article, scroll to the end.

My Babylonian Zionism (and Why It Keeps Me in Far Rockaway)

Introductory Disclaimer: Two Types of Answers

As a Jewish educator, I am often asked, “What do you think about such-and-such?” Sometimes, the questions are more pointed: “What do you hold?” “What is your stance?” or “Do you agree or disagree?” There are two types of answers I give to questions like these.

The first type is an answer based on research and thought. Let’s call this “an informed answer.” I may preface such an answer with the words, “I think such-and-such,” but what I implicitly mean is, “I think such-and-such, and I think I am correct.” Although “I think” is a statement about myself, my primary intent is to weigh in on the subject at hand.

The second type is an answer in which I state what I think or hold (or feel) with full acknowledgment that I have not done my due diligence. I just share my current view, for whatever it’s worth, admitting that my thoughts aren’t based on a comprehensive survey of the relevant facts, haven’t undergone analysis and scrutiny, and might therefore be riddled with errors. Let’s call this “a de facto answer.” Although here, too, I am making a statement about the subject matter, I am primarily making a statement about myself — about my present convictions, regardless of whether those convictions can or should be justified.

If someone objects to a de facto answer by saying, “How can you hold X? What about position Y? What about problem Z? What about authority A or bias B or complexity C?” I might be able to offer a cogent response, but more often than not, the most I can do is shrug and say, “Those are valid points. But you asked me what I think, and this is what I think. It doesn’t mean I should think this, but only that I do think this.”

In this article I will attempt to respond to such questions as “What is your personal stance on Zionism?” “What is your relationship with Eretz Yisrael?” and “Why don’t you make aliyah?” Let the record show that the answers I intend to give are de facto answers — not informed answers.

Some might object, refusing to accept the fact that I even have de facto answers, saying: “Why don’t you have informed answers? How could you not have informed answers on such an important topic? How is that acceptable?!” Of course, I could deflect such questions by finding some objectively important topic about which the objector also doesn’t have an informed opinion (a maneuver known as the “tu quoque fallacy”). Alternatively, I could rationalize my ignorance, pointing to the various reasons at each stage of my development as to why answering such questions was not a top priority for me (a maneuver known as “making excuses“).

But given the nature of de facto answers, I’d probably just shrug (once again) and say, “I don’t know what to tell you. I just haven’t been inclined to look into the topic, for better or for worse.” (For those who are interested in hearing my excuses, they’re waiting behind the paywall.)

So as you read this article — in which I will express views which some will find shocking, disagreeable, even repugnant — bear in mind that my intent here is to give my de facto answer, NOT an informed answer. I’m not here to tell you what you should think. I’m not even here to take a stance on what I should think. I am merely sharing what I do think, hold, and feel, for whatever that’s worth.

And if you don’t think my uninformed thoughts are worth reading, you are more than welcome to stop at any time, free of charge.

Chazal’s Praise of Eretz Yisrael

There are dozens — probably hundreds — of statements made by Chazal in praise of Eretz Yisrael. Instead of compiling and curating my own sample platter, I’ll cite the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 5:10-11:

The greatest sages would kiss the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and would kiss its stones, and roll in its dust. Similarly, it says: "For Your servants desire her stones and cherish her dust" (Tehilim 102:15).

The Sages said: Anyone who dwells in Eretz Yisrael — their iniquities are forgiven, as it is stated, "The inhabitant shall not say, 'I am sick'; the people who dwell there shall be forgiven their sins” (Yeshayahu 33:24). Even one who walks four cubits there merits life in the World to Come. Anyone who is buried there receives atonement, and it is as if that location in which [he is buried] is an altar of atonement, as it is stated: "His land will atone for His people" (Devarim 32:43). Regarding retribution it says: "you shall die upon an impure land" (Amos 7:17). There is no comparison between one who lives and dies there and one whose body is brought there after death. Nevertheless, the greatest sages would bring their dead there. Go and learn from Yaakov Avinu and Yosef ha'Tzadik.

A person should always live in Eretz Yisrael, even in a city whose population is primarily non-Jewish, than dwell in Chutza la’Aretz, even in a city whose population is primarily Jewish, for whoever leaves [Eretz Yisrael] for Chutza la’Aretz (the Diaspora) is [considered] as if he worships avodah zarah, as it is stated: "For they have driven me out today from dwelling in the heritage of Hashem, saying, 'Go worship other gods'“ (I Shmuel 26:19). And in the [prophecies of] retribution it says: "They shall not come to the Land of Israel" (Yechezkel 13:9).

But then, in the final halacha in the chapter, Rambam throws us a curveball:

Just as it is prohibited to leave Eretz [Yisrael] for Chutza la’Aretz, so too, it is prohibited to leave Bavel (Babylonia) for other lands, as it is stated: "They shall be brought to Bavel, and there they shall remain" (Yirmiyahu 27:22).

This principle, as taught by Chazal (which we will examine in the next section), is the foundation for what I will refer to as “Babylonian Zionism.”

What is Babylonian Zionism?

We’ll begin with a short description. Babylonian Zionism is a term I coined for a Zionism which values Israel primarily for the same reasons we value Bavel. The source in Chazal for this concept, which is the source of the Rambam’s halacha, is a Gemara which begins at the bottom of Kesubos 110b:

R' Zeira was avoiding [being seen by his teacher,] Rav Yehuda, [as R' Zeira] sought to make aliyah to Eretz Yisrael [and his teacher disapproved,] as Rav Yehuda said: Anyone who makes aliyah from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael transgresses a positive mitzvah, as it is stated: "They shall be brought to Bavel, and there they shall be" (Yirmiyahu 27:22).

The Baalei Tosafos (Kesubos 111a) comment: “Even though that verse [in Yirmiyahu] speaks of the first [Babylonian] exile, one must say that the pasuk also pertains to the second (i.e. current) exile.” This is clear from the Gemara’s analysis of Rav Yehuda’s position, which picks up on Kesubos 111a:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Just as it is prohibited to leave Eretz Yisrael for Bavel, so too, it is prohibited to leave Bavel for other lands.

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Even to go from Pumbedisa [where one of the major Talmudic academies flourished from the 3rd-11th century CE] to Bei Kuvei [which is located beyond the border of Bavel proper, is not permitted.]

[The Gemara relates:] A certain man left Pumbedisa to [live in] Bei Kuvei, and Rav Yosef excommunicated him. A certain man left Pumbedisa to [live in] Astonia, [which also lay beyond the borders of Bavel proper,] and he died. Abaye said: "Had this Torah scholar wanted, he would [still] be alive, [as he could have stayed in Bavel] ...

Rav Yehuda said: Anyone who lives in Bavel — it is as though he lives in Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated, “Come, O Tzion! Escape, you who dwell with the daughter of Bavel” (Zechariah 2:11).

What are we to make of these statements? How can Rav Yehuda equate Bavel with Eretz Yisrael? Rashi (ibid.) points us in a helpful direction, explaining that it is prohibited to leave Bavel “because there are yeshivos [there] which constantly proliferate Torah.” Similarly, in the Gemara’s discussion about burial, Rashi (ibid.) notes that Bavel is distinguished “because there’s merit of Torah there.” Unfortunately, Rashi doesn’t really elucidate Rav Yehuda’s position beyond these two comments.

The one who really opened my eyes to the idea of Babylonian Zionism was the Meiri (ibid.):

(Note: the Meiri’s comments on our Gemara consist of a single 100+ word run-on sentence, which I broke up into smaller sentences and paragraphs for the sake of clarity.)

Just as it is prohibited to leave Eretz Yisrael for Chutza la’Aretz, so too, it is prohibited to leave Bavel for other lands. The reason is because every place that is metzuyan b’chochmah v’yiras cheit (outstanding in wisdom and fear of sin) has the status of Eretz Yisrael, as [the Sages] said: “Anyone who dwells in Bavel — it is as if he dwells in Eretz Yisrael.”

Everything that they said [about Eretz Yisrael] they only said because Chutza la’Aretz is generally not outstanding in chochmah and yiras cheit for Jews, on account of the many troubles and the yoke of exiles which burden them [there]. [Chochmah and yiras cheit cannot be attained in Chutza la’Aretz] except through tremendous effort, amid the continuous hardships and troubles which are endured for the sake of avodas Hashem by the lone remnant whom Hashem calls.

[In contrast,] Eretz Yisrael is generally a place that is outstanding in chochmah and yiras cheit, to the extent that [those who dwell there] apprehend the glory of their Creator and merit to derive pleasure from the radiance of the shechinah (divine presence). Regarding this [the Sages] said: “Even a [non-Jewish] maidservant in the Land of Israel is assured that she will earn a place in the World to Come,” as the prophet promised when he said: “I will pour out My spirit even on the servants and maidservants” (Yoel 3:1).

Even though the Meiri couldn’t have been clearer, his main points are worth restating. Everything Chazal said about the virtue of living in Eretz Yisrael, they only said because Eretz Yisrael is generally a place that is outstanding in chochmah and yiras cheit. Since Bavel was also a place that was generally outstanding in chochmah and yiras cheit, it had the same status as Eretz Yisrael.

What I find remarkable about the Meiri is that he doesn’t limit the statements of Rav Yehuda to Bavel specifically. Rather, any place that is outstanding in chochmah and yiras cheit has the same status as Eretz Yisrael and Bavel. Moreover, the Meiri doesn’t limit this view to the isolated statements of Rav Yehuda, but applies them to all of Chazal’s statements in praise of Eretz Yisrael, as evidenced by his citation of the teaching “even a non-Jewish maidservant in Eretz Yisrael is assured that she will earn a place in the World to Come” — a statement authored by R’ Abbahu, not Rav Yehuda.

It goes without saying that when the Meiri writes “every place that is metzuyan b’chochmah v’yiras cheit has the status of Eretz Yisrael,” he doesn’t mean this literally. No matter how much chochmah and yiras cheit can be found in Chutza la’Aretz, there are important distinctions that exist, including:

• there are obligations, prohibitions, and other halachos that apply in Eretz Yisrael but not in Chutza la’Aretz

• the Avos were promised Eretz Yisrael by Hashem

• we have a special relationship with Eretz Yisrael based on our national history

• the physical — and, according to many, the metaphysical — topography of Eretz Yisrael has no equivalent in Chutza la’Aretz.

It’s safe to assume that the Meiri would assent to all these points. Yet, that didn’t stop him from interpreting Rav Yehuda’s statements about Bavel and Chazal’s statements about Eretz Yisrael in the manner he did.

We are now in a position to augment our initial definition: “Babylonian Zionism” is a brand of Zionism which values Israel primarily for the same reasons we value Bavel — namely, because Eretz Yisrael is generally outstanding in chochmah and yiras cheit. Accordingly, as the Meiri writes, “every place that is outstanding in chochmah and yiras cheit has the status of Eretz Yisrael” in this regard. It is for this reason that Rav Yehuda maintained that “anyone who lives in Bavel, it is as if he lives in Eretz Yisrael” and “just as it is prohibited to leave Eretz Yisrael for Bavel, so too, it is prohibited to leave Bavel for other lands.”

The key point here is that Babylonian Zionism is only concerned with one variable: how our country of residence contributes to or detracts from our avodas Hashem. This is what allows us to essentially equate Eretz Yisrael with Bavel, despite the many differences that exist between them.

My Bavel

At this point you can probably infer in general terms what I’m about to say, but I’ll spell it out anyway. In September 2002, a few months after graduating from Northwest Yeshiva High School in Seattle, WA,