Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

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Artwork: Skirsdag Flayer, by Austin Hsu

Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

Earlier this week I made the following comment on Facebook: "We all have our least-favorite parshiyos, and Balak is mine." A friend of mine, no doubt trying to appeal to my interests, replied that he views Balak as one of the "Mishlei parshiyot, illustrating archetypes of various, mostly negative, character traits." His comment got me thinking. I associated to a mishnah in Avos 5:19 (or 22):

Whoever has the following three traits is among the students of Avraham Avniu, and [whoever has] three different traits is among the students of the wicked Bilam. Those who have an ayin tovah (good eye), a ruach nemuchah (humble spirit), and a nefesh shefalah (lowly soul) are among the students of Avraham Avinu. Those who have an ayin raah (bad eye), a ruach gevohah (arrogant spirit), and a nefesh rechavah (greedy soul) are among the students of the wicked Bilam. 

How are the students of Avraham Avinu different from the students of the wicked Bilam? The students of Avraham Avinu enjoy [the fruits of their good deeds] in Olam ha'Zeh (This World) and inherit Olam ha'Ba (the World to Come), as it is stated: "To cause those who love Me to inherent [an everlasting] possession (i.e. Olam ha'Ba), and I will fill their storehouses (in Olam ha'Zeh)" (Mishlei 8:21). But the students of the wicked Bilam inherit Gehinom and descend into the Be'er Shachas (the Well of Destruction), as it is stated: "And You, O God, shall lower them into the well of destruction, men of bloodshed and deceit shall not live out half their days; but as for me, I will trust in You" (Tehilim 55:54).

The Rambam [1] provides a full elucidation of this mishnah:

We have already explained several times that "ayin tovah" means histapkus (contentedness with what one has) "nefesh shefalah" refers to prishus (separation from sexual indulgence), and "ruach nemuchah" refers to anavah mufleges (excessive humility), as has been explained in the previous chapter. 

The three [other traits mentioned by the mishnah] are the opposite: lehitus ha'mamon (craving after money), which is "ayin raah," taavas ha'mishgal (sexual lust) is "nefesh rechavah," and gaavah (haughtiness) is "ruach gevohah." 

The three [aforementioned] virtues are widely known to be associated with Avraham Avinu. Therefore, anyone who has these three virtues is called "a student of Avraham," since he conducts himself with [Avraham's] traits. Likewise, anyone who has these three vices is "a student of Bilam," since he conducts himself with [the latter's] traits. 

I will now mention the places in which these virtues are explained in relation to Avraham Avinu and these vices in relation to Bilam - all of which are pesukim in the Torah. 

Avraham Avinu's ayin tovah is [reflected] in his statement to the King of Sedom: "Neither a thread nor a shoelace will I take from anything that is yours" (Bereishis 14:23), for this is the utmost degree of histapkus, for he gave up a huge amount of money and didn't profit from it even in the slightest degree. "Prishus" we see from his statement to Sarah when he came to Egypt: "Behold! Now I know that you are a woman of beautiful appearance" (ibid. 12:11), and the [Oral Torah's] explanation comes [and explains] that he had never fully gazed at her beauty before that day, which is the utmost degree of prishus. It also said regarding Hagar, after he married her: "Behold! Your maidservant is in your hand" (ibid. 16:6), which implies that he had no involvement in enjoying her or behaving flirtatiously with her [prior to then]; and when Sarah asked to send her away with Yishmael, the pasuk testifies that it this was only difficult for him because of the matter of Yishmael alone, in order to clear him of the suspicion that he was sexually inclined towards [Hagar] - all of these are signs of prishus - as it was stated, "and the matter concerning Avram's son greatly displeased him" (ibid. 21:11). As for humility - this is [reflected] in his statement: "I am dust and ashes" (ibid. 18:27). 

Bilam's craving for money was publicized when he came from Aram Naharayim on account of the money with which he was hired to harm Israel, as it is stated: "and because he hired Bilam ben Beor from Pesor in Aram Naharayim to curse you" (Devarim 23:5). The sexual lust [of Bilam] is reflected in how he advised Balak to set loose the [Midianite] women to engage in promiscuity with Israel and to be harlots; were it not for this disposition of sexual lust in his soul - which the matter was pleasing and desirable to him - he wouldn't have commanded [them] to do this, for a person's commandments are the reflection of his mind, since good people do not command others to do bad things, but to avoid them. The pasuk says: "Behold! - they caused Bnei Yisrael, by the word of Bilam, to commit a betrayal against Hashem regarding the matter of Peor" (Bamidbar 31:16), and the Sages said: "Bilam would have sexual relations with his donkey" (Sanhedrin 105a). Without a doubt, someone whose thoughts were this way would have [engaged in such] actions. But his haughtiness is [reflected] in the statement "The words of the one who hears the sayings of God [and knows the knowledge of the Supreme One, who sees the vision of Shaddai, while fallen and with uncovered eyes" (Bamidbar 24:16).

My friend's statement about the contents of Parashas Balak is correct: Chazal's interpretation of Parashas Balak is quite Mishleic indeed!

But this raises a question: Why did Chazal in Avos even need to explain these virtues and vices through Avraham and Bilam? Why couldn't the mishnah have just said: "Anyone who has these three traits is praiseworthy ... anyone who has these three vices is worthy of condemnation," or something like that? Why did Chazal frame these ethical teachings in terms of specific individuals?

The Ralbag [2] answers this question in his explanation of the Torah regimen and its parts:

The second part [of the Torah regimen] encompasses ethical-political wisdom in those areas in which commandment and prohibition are not possible, due to the improbability of attaining perfection of this nature among the masses of people to the same degree as it is possible [to attain perfection] in the realm of Torah-mitzvos. 

For example, if the Torah commanded us to only get angry over something that is worth getting angry about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; or to only be happy about what is worthy of being happy about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; and to only overpower someone who is proper to overpower, and in the proper measure, and at the proper place, and at the proper time; and likewise with all of the other traits and dispositions – [if the Torah did this,] all people would be in a continual state of sin, with the exception of an extreme minority. 

Matters of this nature are not fitting to be subject to command and prohibition, for this will bring people to be more lax in their fulfillment of the other mitzvos, once they see that it is impossible to fulfill many mitzvos of the Torah. For this reason, the Torah teaches us about these matters by telling us stories of our predecessors, who were widely known for their perfection of behavior, in order to guide us to follow in their footsteps and to emulate their behavior. And [the Torah] also told us stories of some of the despicable actions they did, and the harmful consequences that came from them, in order that we avoid doing these actions. 

According to the Ralbag, Hashem could have legislated ethical-political middos-development through halacha - that is, He could have commanded us in laws regulating anger and joy which were as detailed as the laws regulating kashrut and Shabbos - but He didn't do this. Why not? Because it would be impossible for people to adhere to this degree of self-control in their emotions, reactions, and dispositions, and they would inevitably sin. And because people would violate these laws constantly, and be in a constant state of sin, the observance of Torah as a whole would suffer, since people would begin regarding the other areas of halacha with greater laxity and less diligence out of sheer hopelessness.

In order to solve this problem, Hashem incorporated ethical-political development into the Torah regimen through role-models, both good and bad. There are several advantages to this method of inculcating ethics:

(1) This allows for a more flexible, personalized, circumstances-dependent path of ethical-political development for each individual, rather than the rigid, uniform, exacting medium of halachic legislation.

(2) By embedding these ethical-political guidelines in concrete cases involving actual people, it becomes much easier for students of all levels to learn from the behavior of these role models on a variety of levels. Instead of learning abstract principles about humility and haughtiness, the students of Torah can look at people like Avraham, Moshe, Bilam, and Haman, and derive developmentally appropriate lessons from the concrete examples, all in accordance with the developmental level of the student. 

(3) Psychologically there are a number of advantages to learning proper and improper middos from role models - too many to specify in this blog post. Perhaps the best proof of this is that the Torah commandment which obligates to develop good middos is "ve'halachta bi'drachav" - "you shall walk in His ways" (Devarim 28:9). Hashem didn't simply say, "Get good middos!" but rather, "Emulate My ways." Hashem was even willing to compromise the presentation of His Oneness by exponentially multiplying the number of anthropomorphic descriptions of Him in the Torah. That is how important it was to Him (so to speak) to utilize this method of ethical instruction in His Torah. 

This sheds a new light on why the Rambam devoted so much space to bringing proofs from the pesukim to show how the three virtues and three vices are reflected in the Torah's accounts of Avraham and Bilam. His objective isn't just to bring proofs for the mishnah's contentions, but to direct our attention to read the Scriptural narratives about these two people through the ethical lens provided by the mishnah.

According to the Ralbag, we should read ALL of the narratives in the Torah about ALL of the main figures through this ethical lens. Indeed, the Ralbag follows this approach in his Nach commentaries. At the end of every section, he identifies toaliyos b'middos (ethical lessons) that we learn from the behavior and decisions of the Torah's tzadikim (righteous people) and reshaim (wicked people).

And this brings us back to my initial feelings about Parashas Balak. Not only was my friend correct to point me to the Mishleic nature of this parashah, but in doing so, he reminded me that this framework can and should be applied to ALL of the Torah's narrative accounts.

Apparently, Parashas Balak is more interesting than I realized! I just needed the right approach.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Avos Chapter 5
[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on the Torah: Introduction