Parashas Shelach: Unity in Israel and in the Written Torah
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Artwork: Plains (THS), by Steven Belledin
Parashas Shelach: Unity in Israel and in the Written Torah
The Questions
If you ask some average parashah-conscious Jews: "What happens in Parashas Shelach?" they'll likely respond: "The Cheit ha'Meraglim (Sin of the Spies)." They might add: "It also tells the brief story about the mekoshesh eitzim (guy who desecrated Shabbos in public by gathering wood)" or "It concludes with the paragraph about tzitzis - the third paragraph of the Shema." But what they probably will NOT say is: "This week's parashah teaches us the laws of menachos (meal-offerings) and nesachim (wine libations), the mitzvah of challah, and the equality of the ger (convert) with the ezrach (native-born Jew)."
That's right. Immediately after the account of the Cheit ha'Meraglim and before the mekoshesh eitzim and parashah of tzitzis, the Torah takes a seemingly random detour to the laws of menachos and nesachim (Bamidbar 15:1-13), followed by a brief discourse about the equality of the ger (ibid. 15:14-16), followed by the mitzvah of challah (ibid. 15:17-21). [1]
Three questions arise from this non-sequitur:
1. Why does the Torah present these topics here? The halachos of menachos and nesachim really belong in Sefer Vayikra, with the other laws about the korbanos (sacrifices). The laws of challah seem to have nothing to do with the Meraglim. Why were these mitzvos discussed here, of all places?
2. What is being added by the Torah's discussion of the ger? The Torah has already equated the ger with the ezrach on numerous occasions earlier in the Chumash. Is this message being repeated here for emphasis, or is there a specific reason for its reiteration?
3. Why is the the treatment of this topic so repetitive? The pesukim devote a whopping twenty-three extra words to express this point:
When a ger sojourns with you or one who is among you throughout your generations and he shall prepare a fire-offering, a satisfying aroma to Hashem - as you do, so shall he do. For the congregation - the same decree shall be for you and for the ger who sojourns, an eternal decree for your generations; like you like the ger shall it be before Hashem. One Torah and one judgment shall be for you and for the ger who sojourns among you. (Bamidbar 15:14-16).
To paraphrase the Abravanel's statement of this question: "We get it, we GET it! The ger and the ezrach are equal. Why go on at such length - especially about something we already know?"
The Answers
The Abravanel [2] answers all three questions - and in doing so, teaches us an important principle of Torah she'bi'Chsav methodology. He writes:
The meforshim (commentators) have already explained why this section was juxtaposed with the topic of the Meraglim. Moshe (peace be upon him) had promised the people of the Midbar (Wilderness) that their children would enter and inherit the land, but [the members of the generation of the Midbar] were afraid and said, "Who knows what will happen in 40 years? Maybe our children will also sin?"
Therefore, Hashem (blessed is He) saw fit to comfort them and to speak to their hearts, commanding them in the mitzvos of the Land, so they would know that it is evident before Him that they will enter the land. It is for this reason that he [3] commanded them in the nesachim, since they weren't obligated in this in the Midbar, as it is stated in Sifrei (15:2). I think this is because they also didn't offer the Olas Tamid (continual burnt offering) in the Midbar, due to the dearth of animals, flour, oil, and wine ... Through this He promised them that they would, upon entering the land, have many animals - cattle and sheep - and wheat-flour, and oil with which to mix, and wine, and they wouldn't lack anything.
Likewise, for the same reason, he commanded them afterwards in the mitzvah of challah, to promise them that Hashem would give them the land, despite the fact that their fathers didn't merit it because of their sin ... This is why he said, "When you will come into the Land of your dwelling places that I give you" (Bamidbar 15:2), because this was His promise to them that they would inherit it.
The Abravanel has answered our first question. The members of the Dor ha'Midbar (Generation of the Wilderness) were disheartened by the punishment for the Cheit ha'Meraglim. Although Hashem promised them that their children would inherit the Land, they here hesitant to believe this, since they feared that another national cheit on the scale of the Meraglim might delay them in the Midbar even longer - or worse, a cheit on the scale of the Eigel ha'Zahav (Golden Calf) or Korach's Rebellion might result in the entire nation being annihilated.
To allay these fears, Hashem chose this as the time to command them in menachos, nesachim, and challah - mitzvos which were not observed in the Midbar, due to the scarcity of resources, but which would be observed in the Land of Israel. By commanding the Dor ha'Midbar in these mitzvos at this time, Hashem was reassuring them that their children would enter the Land on schedule, and enjoy its bounty.
Next, Abravanel explains the inclusion of the passage about the ger.
It was necessary to command them regarding the nesachim and menachos of gerim because it was explained in Emor that we don't accept any [korbanos] from goyim except for an olah (burnt-offering) ... However, when the goy offers an olah, he would not bring nesachim; only the ezrach (native-born Jew) would be obligated to bring them with his korbanos - not the goy.
For this reason the pasuk needed to say, "Every ezrach shall do so with them etc. When a ger sojourns with you etc." In other words ... don't think that [a ger] is exempt from nesachim, as he was before he converted, when he was a goy, and that he would bring a korban without nesachim. This is not so. Rather, "as you do" with korbanos and nesachim "so shall he (i.e. the ger) do" - without any difference at all.
According to the Abravanel, the topic of the ger's equality is introduced to refute a hava amina (mistaken initial assumption) that one might have after learning the halachos of menachos and nesachim. After learning that goyim are exempt from nesachim, one might mistakenly assume that gerim are also exempt from nesachim, since gerim were once goyim. For this reason, the pasuk teaches us that the ger is subject to the same halacha as the ezrach, and is not equal to the goy. This answers our second question.
The Abravanel answers our third question by providing a reason for each of the Torah's seeming repetitions of the equivalence between the ger and the ezrach:
The Torah gave three reasons for why gerim and ezrachim are equally and uniformly obligated in all of the mitzvos: (1) on account of the congregation, because Israel is one nation in the Land; that being said, how could the ger be obligated in [a] different [set of] mitzvos? (2) on account of God, Who is One, Unique, and unchanging; likewise, those who believe in Him should be completely unified; (3) on account the Torah, which is one regimen and one law, and is [therefore] fitting that it should be equal for all those who believe in it. [4]
Regarding the first reason, on account of the congregation, the pasuk said: "the same decree should be for you and for the ger." Regarding the second reason, on account of Hashem, it said: "an eternal decree for your generations; like you like the ger it shall be before Hashem" - in other words, before Him there is no difference between you and the ger. Regarding the third reason, on account of the unity of the religion and the Torah, it said: "one Torah and one judgment it shall be for you and for the ger who sojourns among you."
The Abravanel's answer to our third question may be summed up as follows. After the Torah equates the ger and the ezrach in their obligation of nesachim, it goes on to provide three reasons why the laws are the same for the ger and the ezrach in all mitzvos. Each of these three reasons is reflected in the nuances of the Torah's repetition.
A Lesson in Torah she'bi'Chsav Methodology
We have now answered all three of our questions. But that's not the end of our journey. I mentioned earlier that there is an important methodological lesson we can glean from the Abravanel's answers.
When my chavrusa and I began working on this area, we were looking for a singular insight which would answer all three questions. We assumed that if we managed to define the underlying theme of this entire section, a unified concept would present itself and resolve all difficulties.
After learning the Abravanel, we realized that this isn't the case. According to the Abravanel, the placement of these three topics - nesachim, ger vs. ezrach, and challah - does not emerge from a single underlying cause; rather, the sequencing of these topics is associative - not conceptual. The associative sequence is as follows:
A. The Torah records the events of the Cheit ha'Meraglim and its aftermath.
B. Because the members of the Dor ha'Midbar were so dejected, Hashem commanded them in mitzvos that are dependent on the Land of Israel: nesachim, menachos, and challah.
C. One of the halachos we learn is that a goy is exempt from bringing nesachim.
D. After learning this halacha, we might mistakenly assume that a ger is also exempt from nesachim, since the ger was once a goy. The Torah therefore teaches us that the ger is equal to the ezrach - in this mitzvah, and in all others.
E. Once it became involved in the topic of the ger's equality, the Torah completes its treatment of this topic by stating the reasons why the ger is equal to the ezrach.
In other words, my chavrusa and I were looking for an underlying Theory "T" as a common denominator, which would explain A, B, C, D, and E - just as a scientific theory is a universal which explains a number of particulars. According to the Abravanel, there is no such theory in this case. Rather, A led to B, B led to C, C led to D, and D led to E.
This associative sequencing is reminiscent of the style of Talmud Bavli. Anyone who has learned Gemara is familiar with how the Gemara will start Topic A, get bogged down in a discussion about sub-Topic B, resolve the issue by moving to Topic C, and while it's there, throw in a midrash about Topic D, which leads to a chain of other midrashim by Rabbi E, and so on.
My chavrusa and I learned two things from this: (1) Torah she'bi'Chsav might juxtapose topics for associative reasons, rather than conceptual ones; (2) this is yet another example of why we shouldn't harbor preconceived notions about what an answer is "supposed" to look like - lest we miss out on answers which do not conform to our predefined parameters.
[1] The topic after that is korbanos for the unintentional worship of avodah zarah (idolatry), which is then followed by the mekoshesh eitzim. I didn't include this in my questions because the relationship between these two topics is clear, due to the strong relationship between Shabbos and avodah zarah. I wrote about this connection in Parashas Shelach: Shabbos, Avodah Zarah, and Skilah.
[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:13-16
[3] I'm fairly certain that this should be a lowercase "he," in reference to Moshe Rabbeinu, because a few sentences later the Abravanel says: "Likewise, for the same reason, he commanded them afterwards in the mtizvah of challah, to promise them that Hashem would give them the land" - and in that sentence it would be a stretch to read the "he" as referring to Hashem.
[4] Personally, I liked the Ralbag's statement of this explanation even better, despite the fact that he was answering a different question: "The Torah is a single, perfect regimen aimed at one objective; as such, it is impossible to add or subtract from it - and for this reason, it would be impossible [for someone] to accept only part of this regimen" (Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:15).