Vayechi: Don’t Stop Working Or Else You’ll Die (Especially If You’re Not Jewish)

Did you know that, according to Rashi, a non-Jew is forbidden to take a day off of work? Torah Temimah's elucidation of a strange midrash on Yaakov Avinu's death sheds light on Rashi's strict view.

Dec 29, 2023

Article voiceover

1×

0:00

-15:39

The Torah content for the remainder of 2023 has been sponsored by Rivkie and Dovi Siderson with the following message from Rivkie: "Thank you to Rabbi for providing me with a solid foundation of Torah and Jewish philosophy, and for 8+ years of great learning! And to Avital on her 23rd birthday (even though we can’t be there in person). I’m so grateful for your friendship, mind, and support. I love learning with you and from you, and can’t wait to continue, IY”H. Happy birthday from the Sidersons!"

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article.

Artwork: Adobe Firefly 2.0’s response to the ChatGPT 3.5-generated prompt: “oil painting that explores the theme of 'if you stop working, your life will end.' Create a visually striking and thought-provoking artwork that conveys the urgency and pressure associated with the relentless pursuit of productivity and success in modern society. Use color, composition, and symbolism to capture the essence of this theme, while leaving room for interpretation and emotional resonance”

Vayechi: Don’t Stop Working Or Else You’ll Die (Especially If You’re Not Jewish)

Note: Those who follow my adventures are aware of the irony in this week’s title and topic. After nearly reaching a state of burnout, I took a much-needed break from work. As I do every year, I went on a solo cabin retreat for a week to recharge, doing nothing but reading and learning. Since I only got back on Thursday evening, I didn’t have time to write a short article, nor did I have time to edit what I wrote as much as I would have liked. I’m still happy with the results, and I hope you are too!

The Halacha of Goy she’Shovas: a Non-Jew Who Keeps Shabbos

While I was in the process of converting to Judaism, I had to undergo a weekly experience familiar to all Orthodox Jewish converts. At some point, between sundown on Friday and nightfall on Saturday, I had to violate Shabbos. Why? Because it is prohibited for a non-Jew to keep Shabbos, as the Gemara (Sanhedrin 58b) states:

Reish Lakish says: A non-Jew who observed Shabbos (goy she’shovas, lit. a gentile who abstains from work) is liable for death, as it is stated: “[All the rest of the days of the earth: sowing and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter,] day and night shall not cease” (Bereishis 8:22) … Ravina says: even [if he abstains from work on] a Monday, [he is liable].

Rambam (Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 10:9) clarifies the reason for this law and its seemingly harsh penalty:

A non-Jew who engaged in Torah study is liable for death. He may only involve himself in [the study] of the seven [Noahide] mitzvos alone. Likewise, a non-Jew who abstained [from work], even on a weekday, if he made it like a Shabbos for himself, is liable for death – and certainly if he made a holiday for himself.
The sum of the matter is that we do not permit them (i.e. non-Jews) to invent their own religious law and create [new] mitzvos for themselves. Rather, he must either become a ger tzedek (righteous convert) and accept all the mitzvos upon himself or remain with his Torah and neither add nor subtract. And if he engaged in Torah study or kept Shabbos or invented a [religious] precept, we administer lashes and punish him and we inform him that he is liable for death, but he is not [actually] executed.

Even though the Rambam goes on in the next halacha (ibid. 10:10) to say that a non-Jew may do or keep any of the other 613 mitzvos on a voluntary basis, Shabbos is the exception. For reasons beyond the scope of this article, a non-Jew’s observance of our Shabbos is considered for them as inventing a new mitzvah. Although the death penalty is not actually carried out, we inform them that this breach is severe enough to deserve death – presumably because it erodes the line between the two Divinely ordained systems of law: the Taryag Mitzvos (613 commandments) for Jews and the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach (Seven Noahide Commandments) for non-Jews.

All this is fine and well according to Rambam. Rashi (Sanhedrin 58b), however, has a far more stringent take:

Ravina says: even a Monday – do not say that when Reish Lakish mentioned shevisah (abstention from work) that he was referring to [a non-Jew] who takes [shevisah] upon himself in the manner of an obligation – such as Shabbos, which is a day of shevisah for Israel, or Sunday on which the Christians rest – but rather, he maintains that mere rest is prohibited for them, that they may not be idle from their work even on a day that is not designated for rest, [such as] Monday.

That’s right: Rashi maintains that it is prohibited for non-Jews to take a single day off from work for any reason. The Gemara uses the term shevisah. For the Rambam, this means “abstention from work in a Sabbath-like manner,” since only that kind of abstention is tantamount to introducing a new religious precept. In contrast, Rashi learns that “goy she’shovas” is not referring to shevisah l’shoom chovah (abstention from work in the manner of an obligation) but rather to “menuchah b’alma” (mere rest), “she’lo ye’vatlu mi’melachtan” (that they may not be idle from their work).

In practical terms, a Christian who religiously observes his Sabbath on Sunday violates this halacha according to both Rambam and Rashi, but according to Rashi, the same is true for a non-religious gentile who takes off from work on New Year’s Day. Furthermore, according to Rashi, non-Jews who take extended vacations or voluntarily enter retirement are racking up death penalty violation after death penalty violation!

How are we to understand Rashi’s extreme position? Rambam provides us with a rational framework for understanding this halacha – namely, that the Torah seeks to maintain a clear distinction between Taryag Mitzvos for Jews and Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach for non-Jews – but Rashi’s view would seem to defy explanation. I was bothered by this question for decades until I found an answer in this week’s parashah – one which casts this halacha in an entirely different light and has ramifications for Jews and our relationship with work.

Man Only Dies on Account of Idleness

“When Yaakov finished commanding his sons, he gathered his feet into the bed; and he expired and was gathered to his people” (Bereishis 49:33). The expression used for Yaakov’s death, “vayigva va’yomos,” is also used for the deaths of Avraham (25:8), Yishmael (25:17), and Yitzchak (39:29) – yet, from our pasuk about Yaakov, R’ Tarfon (Avos d’Rebbi Nosson 11:1) makes a bizarre derivation: “man only dies on account of batalah (idleness), as it is stated, ‘and he expired and he was gathered to his people.’” Where does he get this from and what does he mean?

The Torah Temimah (Bereishis 49:33, note 47) begins by criticizing an unnamed commentator’s failed attempts to resolve this difficulty and then offers his own explanation:

There is no explanation for this, and the one who endeavored to explain has toiled excessively with farfetched statements. [Rather,] it seems obvious that [R’ Tarfon] relied on the first half of the pasuk: “When Yaakov finished commanding his sons … he expired and was gathered.” [In other words,] as long as he was still commanding [his sons,] he lived, but once he ceased commanding, he expired. This is an allusion to the principle that man only dies on account of idleness. This has a nafkah minah (practical ramification) which is spelled out in that chapter of Avos d’Rebbi Nosson, namely, that every person should strive to seek out for himself some type of work to be involved in even if he doesn’t need it, so that he doesn’t sit idly, and [the Sages in Avos d’Rebbi Nosson] support this from various pesukim; see there.

That chapter in Avos d’Rebbi Nosson expands on the teaching of Shemaya in Avos 1:10: “love work (ehov es ha’melechah), despise positions of authority, and do not become overly familiar with the authorities.” One of the most eye-opening statements there about the imperative to work is that of R’ Yehudah ben Beseira:

If someone has no work to do, what should he do? If he has a dilapidated yard or field, he should go and work it, as it says: “Six days you shall labor and do all your work” (Shemos 20:8). What do we learn from the phrase, “do all your work”? That even someone who has dilapidated yards or fields should work on them.

The Torah Temimah (Shemos 20:8, note 62) elucidates R’ Yehudah ben Beseira’s intent:

This means to say that even though he doesn’t have any need for the work itself, he should strive to come up with some work for himself – even [work] such as this, which is not necessary for him – if only for the purpose of not being idle, so that he shouldn’t cause his own death. [R’ Yehudah ben Beseira] supports this with the language of the pasuk: “you shall do all your work,” expounding on the word “all your work” to mean “any work whatsoever, even dilapidated yards.” This was intended by way of remez (textual allusion) and asmachta (homiletical Scriptural support).

The main message of R’ Yehudah ben Beseirah and the Sages cited in Avos d’Rebbi Nosson is that idleness causes premature death. He doesn’t elaborate on how idleness causes premature death – whether on account of the spiritual hazards, as in the Christian proverb, “idle hands are the devil’s playground,” or because of the toll taken by physical or mental inactivity, as numerous contemporary studies have shown, or for some other reason. Regardless of the causality, the life shortening consequences of idleness are so dire that R’ Yehudah ben Beseira prescribed doing unnecessary labor to avoid this fate.

It is this phenomenon that R’ Tarfon was referring to when he expounded on our pasuk in Vayechi, teaching that “man only dies on account of idleness.” He did not mean that Yaakov should have kept on talking in order to live forever, nor did he mean that Hashem killed him for “the sin of idleness” (God forbid). Rather, R’ Tarfon merely used the pasuk about Yaakov as an asmachta (homiletical support) for Chazal’s attitude towards idleness.

Idleness for Jews vs. Idleness for Non-Jews

The Torah Temimah (Shemos 20:8, note 62) continues with an important qualification of R’ Yehudah ben Beseira’s teaching, then immediately pivots to an explanation of Rashi’s strict stance on the halacha of goy she’shovas:

It seems that all this (i.e. the idea that idleness causes death) applies exclusively to an am ha’aretz (ignoramus) for whom it is impossible to be involved in Torah study – but for chachamim (the wise), their Torah is their craft. Elsewhere we wrote that this is the reason for the Noahide mitzvah of “day and night shall not cease,” because since it is prohibited for them to engage in Torah, and Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu cares about His creations, therefore, He commanded them not to be idle, so as to not cause their premature death. We elaborated on this at length in Parashas Noach.

Abstention from work only hastens death for those who lack the capacity to be involved in Torah. If one uses the time off from work for Torah study, then this teaching doesn’t apply. It is for this reason that Hashem prohibited non-Jews to take off from work: because He is concerned for their wellbeing and doesn’t want them to die prematurely, and because it is prohibited for non-Jews to engage in Torah study, therefore, the only viable option for prolonging life in the gentile world is to prevent them from falling prey to idleness. As he mentioned above, the Torah Temimah spells this out fully in Parashas Noach (Bereishis 8:22, note 17) after raising our question:

Rashi explains that a non-Jew who rests from his work for a complete day is liable for death, as it is stated, “day and night shall not cease.” [Reish Lakish] expounds: “‘they shall not cease’ from work, and this refers also to Bnei Noach” … The reason for this mitzvah and for its death penalty are not at all clear. Perhaps it can be explained based on what was stated in Avos d’Rebbi Nosson on the pasuk, “six days shall you labor and do all your work” … According to this, we can say that the reason why Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu commanded a person to work is so that he doesn’t bring about his own death; this explains the meaning of the expression “[a non-Jew who rests] is liable for death,” which is intended in the same way as the expression “he is liable for his soul.”

This is the final piece of the puzzle. Neither Rambam nor Rashi take the death penalty in the Gemara Sanhedrin literally, but whereas the Rambam understands it in a philosophically prescriptive sense (i.e. this non-Jew should be put to death), Rashi (as explained by the Torah Temimah) understands it in a purely descriptive sense (i.e. a non-Jew who stops working will naturally hasten his death). This is why the Torah Temimah invokes the phrase “mischayev b’nafsho” (“he is liable for his soul”), which refers to behavior that is naturally self-destructive.

It turns out that in a sense, the halacha of goy she’shovas is less stringent for Rashi than it is for the Rambam. According to the Rambam, a non-Jew who observes his own Sabbath-like day of rest is committing a severe crime: the illicit innovation of a new type of religious observance. According to Rashi, this has nothing to do with religion. Rather, God, in His mercy, seeks to benefit His creations. Since idleness truncates the human lifespan, Hashem prohibited mankind from taking time off work. That is why a non-Jew may not observe Shabbos.

One problem remains: according to this line of reasoning, shouldn’t this apply to Jews as well? Granted, we observe Shabbos for a number of valid reasons, but shouldn’t it be prohibited for Jews to take off work on a Monday? Torah Temimah (ibid.) raises this question and answers it using the same principle he invoked above:

Even though, according to this, it would be reasonable to apply this law not only to a non-Jew but even to a Jew (i.e. that if a Jew abstains from work for a complete day not on Shabbos, then “he is liable for his soul”), one can respond by saying that a Jew can be involved in Torah and serving [God] even when he abstains [from work], whereas a non-Jew who is involved in Torah is liable for death, and the involvement in his own seven mitzvos is miniscule and easy. If so, there is no other option than [for the non-Jew] to be involved in work. And the statement in Avos d’Rebbi Nosson [which states that even a Jew should not be idle] refers to a regular person who is not qualified to be engaged in Torah [study].

Essentially, his answer is: yes, all things being equal, a Jew who takes off from work is “liable for his soul” just the same as a non-Jew. Fortunately, all things are not equal: whereas a non-Jew has no recourse outside of work, a Jew can use his time off to study Torah and to engage in other mitzvos. To the extent he does that, his life will not be shortened. To the contrary, “The Torah is a tree of life to all who cling to it” (Mishlei 3:18), “length of days are at its right hand” (ibid. 3:16) and “wisdom gives life to the one who possess it” (Koheles 7:12).

Addendum

Torah Temimah concludes his comments in Parashas Noach by examining the Rambam in light of his own view:

Further analysis is required regarding what the Rambam wrote on this topic that this law [which forbids a non-Jew to abstain from work for a day] only applies if [the non-Jew] abstains with intent of a mitzvah of shevisah, thereby making the day for himself like the day of Shabbos, and only then is he liable for death. According to our explanation [above], it ostensibly wouldn’t make any difference what his intention was in his abstention from work. We may resolve this by saying that as long as he does not abstain in a Sabbath-like manner – that is, a total shevisah – then he is not completely idle, for he will [naturally] be involved in lighter forms of work and in preparing his food. There is no need to elaborate.

In other words, the Torah Temimah removes intention from the Rambam’s formulation of the halacha. When the Rambam writes “a non-Jew who abstained [from work], even on a weekday, if he made it like a Shabbos for himself, he is liable for death,” he doesn’t mean “if he regarded it as Shabbos” or “if he abstained with Shabbos-like intent.” Rather, he means “if he totally abstained from all melachah, as Jews do on Shabbos.” Accordingly, if the non-Jew engages in any form of work at all – like I made sure to do when I was converting – then he has not violated this halacha.

Have you learned any other explanations for why a non-Jew can’t keep Shabbos? I’m familiar with the Meiri’s, which I felt didn’t really belong in this article, but I’d be curious to learn other ideas!

The Rabbi Schneeweiss Substack

Discussion about this post