Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 3: Approach #2)

In this third installment, we examine a second approach to our question about the Torah's double-standard of avodas parech for non-Jewish slaves - one which is the opposite of our first approach.

May 29, 2024

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Adobe Firefly 3.0’s response to the prompt “painting of a male servant in ancient garb digging a hole” using a stock reference image for style

Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 3: Approach #2)

Click here for Part 1 and here for Part 2.

Approach #2: Avodas Parech is Only Ethically Wrong for Jews

In our first approach we assumed that avodas parech is inherently unethical … but what if we were wrong? This might seem counterintuitive, but I believe it is supported by the Sifra (Toras Kohanim 25:46) on the pasuk: “and with your brethren, the Children of Israel – each man with his brother – you shall not subjugate him b’farech” (Vayikra 25:46). From here the Sages infer: “‘you shall not subjugate him (i.e. a fellow Jew who is an eved) b’farech,’ but you may subjugate a free [Jew] b’farech.” Torah Temimah (ibid. note 248) explains the rationale: “since he accepts this upon himself willingly, on account of the pleasure of receiving reward and the like.”

If avodas parech were inherently unethical, the Torah would not permit an employer to subject a Jewish employee to it simply because he’s willing to get paid for it. For example, halacha does not permit us to strike or wound or curse a fellow Jew, no matter how much money he accepts as a payment.

However, the Torah does prohibit the physical abuse of a non-Jewish slave, stating: “If a man strikes the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant, and destroys it, he shall send him free for his eye. And if he knocks out the tooth of his slave or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall send him free for his tooth” (Shemos 21:26-27). According to the Oral Torah, this is not limited to eyes and teeth; rather, “if a person intentionally struck his slave and caused him to lose one of the 24 tips of his limbs or organs that will not regenerate, he is granted his freedom” (Rambam, Hilchos Avadim 5:4). We initially assumed that the Torah permitted avodas parech with a non-Jewish slave despite its immorality – but what if these laws which regulate of our physical treatment of the eved Canaani reflect the threshold of immorality? What if avodas parech is permitted because it is not inherently immoral?

Let us reassess the practice of avodas parech from this fresh perspective, beginning with a review of the definition: avodas parech is any task that has no defined limit or whose output is not necessary in and of itself. When you think about it, there are many legitimate reasons why a slave owner might command his slave to engage in avodas parech: to prevent idleness, which is the source of much trouble; to deter laziness, which is an undesirable quality in a slave; to reinforce his own authority, which may be necessary even in a free workplace or institution and is vital in the relationship between a slave and his master; to maintain his slave’s physical fitness, which is necessary from both a practical and economic standpoint; to preserve routine and order, thereby ensuring a baseline of smooth operations; to train his slave for future tasks by developing his skills, just as apprentices practice on raw materials; and to prevent the slave from getting into trouble or engaging in other problematic behavior.

My point is not that avodas parech is inherently justified – only that it is not inherently objectionable. It is a morally neutral tool that can be utilized by a master in a targeted manner in specific situations. Review the list above and consider how many similar activities take place in our free society for similar purposes. Coaches subject their players to avodas parech all the time – making them run laps, do pushups, practice maneuvers – and nobody views this as immoral. Students engage in countless unproductive exercises when preparing for standardized tests, and although one might object to this practice on educational grounds, nobody deems it “abuse.” Try bursting into a gym and shouting, “I am here to liberate all ye oppressed by the avodas parech of dumbbells!” and you’ll likely be thought of as a crazy person. The gym bro endlessly weights is a paradigm of an eved engaged in avodas parech, but because our society justifies this in the framework of physical fitness, we don’t bat an eye.

Why do we condemn the Egyptians for enslaving our ancestors with avodas parech? The answer is simple: just because avodas parech isn’t intrinsically unethical doesn’t mean it can’t be done unjustly. The Egyptians didn’t deserve punishment because they utilized the Israelites for avodas parech from time to time. Rather, “Egypt enslaved Bnei Yisrael b’farech, and they embittered their lives with harsh labor – with mortar and bricks and all work in the field – all the work that they worked them with was b’farech” (Shemos 1:13-14). Their entire enslavement of Israel was characterized by avodas parech – and they did so deliberately in order to oppress us, as it is stated: “and the Egyptians wronged us and afflicted us and placed harsh labor upon us” (Devarim 26:6).

Consider this analogy: Soldiers in basic training are subjected to avodas parech all the time, performing tasks with no practical necessity and engaging in limitless physical exertion (“and you’ll keep at it until I say so, soldier!”). Do we view basic training as evil? No! Why not? Because we recognize that this avodas parech trains the soldier’s mind and body, instills discipline, builds stamina and endurance, and breaks down the individual ego to build it up as part of his unit, his branch of the armed services, and his country.

But what if a soldier’s boot camp had no end? What if he was left there forever? What if an entire nation was enslaved in a boot-camp-like existence for generations, like the Soviet Gulag, the North Korean prison camps, or the Chinese “re-education” camps? That would be evil. That is what Egypt did to us.

If you’ve found this argument compelling thus far, you may be wondering if we’ve made too strong of a case! According to this approach, why would the Torah prohibit avodas parech for Jews? The best answer I’ve heard so far was given by my talmid, Michael Gordon (who has his own substack!) in a comment on my original article:

The guidelines of how to treat a Jewish slave seems to [be] tied to a unique quality of a Jew: his ancestors were slaves in Egypt. If the reason of the mitzvah is not about cruelty but rather to avoid a reenactment of the slavery in Egypt, then it makes sense – the issue isn’t a Jew inflicting avodas parech, but a Jew experiencing ‎avodas parech. The halacha in the Rambam supports this too … even if a Jew isn’t inflicting it, we are obligated to prevent a Jew from reliving the slavery of Egypt.

I like Michael’s answer but would frame it slightly differently. The prohibition of avodas parech aims to prevent the Jewish people from experiencing national retraumatization. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services defines retraumatization as “reliving stress reactions experienced as a result of a traumatic event when faced with a new, similar incident” (samhsa.gov). A recent example can be seen in Holocaust survivors, whose traumas can be reawakened when they are placed in similar situations to what they experienced in the camps. A growing number of studies have shown that such trauma can be passed onto subsequent generations.

We experienced national trauma from the avodas parech of Egyptian slavery. The Torah prohibits retraumatizing a fellow Jew by imposing avodas parech or ignoring it when done by non-Jews. Thus, there is nothing inherently wrong with subjecting an eved Canaani to avodas parech, since they don’t share our history of national oppression. For us, avodas parech revives our national trauma, while for them, it is a normal part of being eved.

I have one last approach which I hope to write about tomorrow. It’s more radical than the others, but I think it has merit.

Which of the two approaches appeals to you the most? And if the answer is “neither,” then can you think of a third approach?

The Rabbi Schneeweiss Substack

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