What do you think about carrying on Shabbos? Whatever they are, I can guarantee you'll have a greater appreciation after learning Rav Hirsch's perspective!
I think Rav Hirsch's analysis is undermined by what you noted, that chazal proscribed commerce because it would lead to writing, based on the same verses in Nechemiah. If hotza'ah is about preventing commerce, it would have been much more straightforward for the rabbis to say "no commerce, because it involves or may lead to the melacha of carrying." The fact that they pick "writing," despite the fact that much commerce can be done without writing (and to some degree is done, like buying aliyot in some communities on shabbat), indicates to me that Rav Hirsch is probably incorrect in either point of his analysis (his assigned importance or his interpretation). This concept of hotza'ah preventing commerce also ignores the buying and selling of labor/services (which are not subsumed under the rubric of melacha), which would not involve transporting goods, but would be materialistic in the same problematic way you describe. (Of course, in today's credit based society, you can also conduct commerce without transporting any physical goods that day or even ever)
On the other hand, one could defend Rav Hirsch's concept of "societal melacha" here by contradicting his particular formulation, and narrowing significantly, saying that similar to trapping an animal where the animal changed from "free" to "owned," the concept of ownership is societal, and having something change possession between two parties is a similar change in status. (Though I recognize such a transformation of Rav Hirsch's and your perspective makes it much less appealing)
Solid critique! The meforshim on Nechemiah also seem to suggest that no דאורייתא transgressions took place here - yet, he definitely does highlight הוצאה. Makes me wonder how much these rebukes were framed based on people's perception rather than rigid halachic categories. Thanks for sharing your thoughts!
This is a good question with or without Rav Hirsch. Isn't it obvious that commerce involves and may lead to carrying? We can go further. If Shofar or Megillah are prohibited because it will lead to carrying, how much moreso commerce should be prohibited for that reason? The truth is I am not sure where you got "chazal proscribed commerce because it would lead to writing" from. Maybe the Rambam sounds like that? But my understanding of Rashi in Beitzah is that actual commerce is an איסור מדברי קבלה (from Nechemia), and other tangential prohibitions, like betrothal or divorce, are related to writing.
Rav Hirsch was citing Rambam's Hilchos Shabbos 23:12:
רמב"ם שבת כ"ג:י"ב
כותב מאבות מלאכות, לפיכך אסור לכחול בפוך וכיוצא בו בשבת, מפני שהוא ככותב. ואסור ללוות ולהלוות, גזירה שמא יכתוב. וכן אסור לקנות ולמכור ולשכור ולהשכיר, שמא יכתוב. לא ישכור אדם פועלין בשבת, ולא יאמר לחבירו לשכור לו פועלין. אבל לשאול ולהשאיל מותר:
I do think it was very possible (if not the default) for commerce to be done over non-movable objects (such as land) or property not at hand. Regardless, I very much appreciate you pointing out to me that I should be much more careful when taking "truths" for granted such as my repetition of the claim that commerce is forbidden due to writing. I did not appreciate that it was absent from the gemara, and that Rashi's articulation is ambiguous. thank you!
Good point about non-movable objects. But maybe that's the answer to your question about the Rambam giving the reason of writing vs. Rav Hirsch saying hotzaah has to do with commerce. Because the reason of writing would cover buying and selling real estate, slaves, services, etc, which carrying wouldn't apply to, so the Rambam/Chazal went with that. But for movable objects, there would also be the reason of hotzaah.
From a biblical perspective (i.e., the sources you cite along with Shemos 16) it seems that the issue with "carrying" is engaging in large-scale commercial activity which mars the sanctity of Shabbos. As Shadal noted from Rambam, buying and selling are permissible from a biblical standpoint. Tanach seems fine with folks going out to purchase something from the market for "Kiddush" (ditto for "carrying" personal effects), the problem is the mass hauling of the goods on Saturday proper. From a biblical standpoint allowing "creative" melacha or "carrying" has the same effect—people engaging in their livelihood on a commercial scale and in an everyday manner which is incongruent with the cessation of typical work and labor that Shabbos demands.
I think Rav Hirsch's analysis is undermined by what you noted, that chazal proscribed commerce because it would lead to writing, based on the same verses in Nechemiah. If hotza'ah is about preventing commerce, it would have been much more straightforward for the rabbis to say "no commerce, because it involves or may lead to the melacha of carrying." The fact that they pick "writing," despite the fact that much commerce can be done without writing (and to some degree is done, like buying aliyot in some communities on shabbat), indicates to me that Rav Hirsch is probably incorrect in either point of his analysis (his assigned importance or his interpretation). This concept of hotza'ah preventing commerce also ignores the buying and selling of labor/services (which are not subsumed under the rubric of melacha), which would not involve transporting goods, but would be materialistic in the same problematic way you describe. (Of course, in today's credit based society, you can also conduct commerce without transporting any physical goods that day or even ever)
On the other hand, one could defend Rav Hirsch's concept of "societal melacha" here by contradicting his particular formulation, and narrowing significantly, saying that similar to trapping an animal where the animal changed from "free" to "owned," the concept of ownership is societal, and having something change possession between two parties is a similar change in status. (Though I recognize such a transformation of Rav Hirsch's and your perspective makes it much less appealing)
Solid critique! The meforshim on Nechemiah also seem to suggest that no דאורייתא transgressions took place here - yet, he definitely does highlight הוצאה. Makes me wonder how much these rebukes were framed based on people's perception rather than rigid halachic categories. Thanks for sharing your thoughts!
This is a good question with or without Rav Hirsch. Isn't it obvious that commerce involves and may lead to carrying? We can go further. If Shofar or Megillah are prohibited because it will lead to carrying, how much moreso commerce should be prohibited for that reason? The truth is I am not sure where you got "chazal proscribed commerce because it would lead to writing" from. Maybe the Rambam sounds like that? But my understanding of Rashi in Beitzah is that actual commerce is an איסור מדברי קבלה (from Nechemia), and other tangential prohibitions, like betrothal or divorce, are related to writing.
Rav Hirsch was citing Rambam's Hilchos Shabbos 23:12:
רמב"ם שבת כ"ג:י"ב
כותב מאבות מלאכות, לפיכך אסור לכחול בפוך וכיוצא בו בשבת, מפני שהוא ככותב. ואסור ללוות ולהלוות, גזירה שמא יכתוב. וכן אסור לקנות ולמכור ולשכור ולהשכיר, שמא יכתוב. לא ישכור אדם פועלין בשבת, ולא יאמר לחבירו לשכור לו פועלין. אבל לשאול ולהשאיל מותר:
Thanks, missed that
I do think it was very possible (if not the default) for commerce to be done over non-movable objects (such as land) or property not at hand. Regardless, I very much appreciate you pointing out to me that I should be much more careful when taking "truths" for granted such as my repetition of the claim that commerce is forbidden due to writing. I did not appreciate that it was absent from the gemara, and that Rashi's articulation is ambiguous. thank you!
Good point about non-movable objects. But maybe that's the answer to your question about the Rambam giving the reason of writing vs. Rav Hirsch saying hotzaah has to do with commerce. Because the reason of writing would cover buying and selling real estate, slaves, services, etc, which carrying wouldn't apply to, so the Rambam/Chazal went with that. But for movable objects, there would also be the reason of hotzaah.
From a biblical perspective (i.e., the sources you cite along with Shemos 16) it seems that the issue with "carrying" is engaging in large-scale commercial activity which mars the sanctity of Shabbos. As Shadal noted from Rambam, buying and selling are permissible from a biblical standpoint. Tanach seems fine with folks going out to purchase something from the market for "Kiddush" (ditto for "carrying" personal effects), the problem is the mass hauling of the goods on Saturday proper. From a biblical standpoint allowing "creative" melacha or "carrying" has the same effect—people engaging in their livelihood on a commercial scale and in an everyday manner which is incongruent with the cessation of typical work and labor that Shabbos demands.