Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 4: Approach #3)

This third and final approach to answering our question about why the Torah permits avodas parech of an eved Canaani is the most radical of them all.

May 31, 2024

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The Torah content this week has been dedicated by me in honor of Ann with gratitude for her monthly support of my Torah content and in celebration of her engagement to Ben. Mazal tov!

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Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and here for the complete four-part series compiled into a single PDF.

Adobe Firefly 3.0’s response to the prompt “painting of a male servant in ancient garb digging a hole” using a stock reference image for style

Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor (Part 4: Approach #3)

Click here for Part 1, here for Part 2, and here for Part 3.

Approach #3: Avodas Parech as a Philosophical Prohibition

Rambam (Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:31) prefaces his explanation of the reasons for the mitzvos as follows:

Every one of the 613 mitzvos serves to inculcate a true view or remove a false view, or to establish righteous conduct [in society] or remove an injustice, or to train us in a good character trait or to caution us against an evil character trait. Everything is dependent on these three things: hashkafos (ideas), middos (character traits), and actions which shape society (justice) … Thus, these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for each and every mitzvah.

Until now, we’ve assumed that avodas parech is prohibited for reasons of middos or justice. But what if it is prohibited for philosophical reasons, “to inculcate a true view or remove a false view”? This approach emerged naturally from the previous one. Once we consider the possibility that avodas parech isn’t inherently ethically wrong, we must also entertain the possibility that it’s not ethically wrong at all. In Part 3, I argued for an ethically neutral view of avodas parech, and this article builds on that argument.

Before delving into a new theory about avodas parech, I’d like to showcase an example of a mitzvah that, at first glance, aims at ethical or societal ends but can also be interpreted as having a philosophical objective. This will serve as a paradigm for our analysis of avodas parech.

The Torah prohibits us from returning to Egypt to settle there; we are only permitted to travel there for business or to pass through en route to another land. Rambam (Sefer ha’Mitzvos – Lo Taaseh #42) incorporates the reason for this mitzvah into his formulation of the mitzvah itself: “[God] prohibited us from dwelling in the Land of Egypt forever, so that we not learn from their practices and not follow their disgraceful ways.” Sefer ha’Chinuch (Mitzvah #500) offers a similar explanation:

The reason for this mitzvah is because the people in Egypt are evil and sinners, and God (blessed is He), in His kindness, took us out from their hand and redeemed us to make us meritorious by following the ways of truth, and desired in His great goodness for us to no longer return to become impure among them, so that we don’t learn their behaviors, and we don’t follow their despicable ways over our Torah.

In Rambam’s threefold division of taamei ha’mitzvos (reasons for the commandments) listed above, the Torah prohibition against living in Egypt either falls into the category of middos, aiming to keep us away from the bad character traits prevalent in Egyptian culture, or justice, preventing us from being influenced by the unethical interpersonal conduct that characterized Egyptian society.

The problem is that there are no longer any Egyptians in Egypt. The ancient Egyptian people, whose behavior, culture, and beliefs are condemned as “abominable” by the Torah (cf. Vayikra 18:3,24-30), began their decline with the Persian Conquest (525 BCE), continued dwindling through the Hellenistic Period (332 BCE), the Roman Conquest (30 BCE), and the era of Christianization (4^th-6^th centuries CE), and had all but vanished by the Arab Conquest (7^th century CE). Today, 85-90% of the people living in modern-day Egypt are Muslim, and 10-15% are Coptic Christians. The forms of institutionalized slavery, sexual depravity, and primitive avodah zarah are long gone. This mitzvah is still binding, but its purpose – according to Rambam and Sefer ha’Chinuch – is obsolete.

It’s possible that Rambam and Sefer ha’Chinuch hold that this prohibition was given specifically for the time period when Egypt was a dominant power on the world stage. If the Jewish people had returned to Egypt at any point within the first millennium after the Giving of the Torah, it would have been disastrous, and this prohibition safeguarded against that outcome. The fact that this mitzvah is no longer “relevant” in the same way is similar to the Torah’s prohibitions against the burning of infants to Molech, shaving the corners of one’s hair in emulation of idolatrous priests, or any other mitzvos that have reached their “mission accomplished” stage and have served their purpose in the history of Israel and mankind. (See my recent shiur, How the Seemingly Outdated Aspects of Torah Are Evidence of Its Perfection for an elaboration on this general approach.)

I would like to suggest that there is a secondary reason for this Torah prohibition. Dozens of mitzvos were commanded as a zeicher l’Yetzias Mitzrayim (a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt). Yetzias Mitzrayim is a core part of our identity and the foundation of our knowledge of God. Perhaps the prohibition against returning to Egypt is another form of zeicher l’Yetzias Mitzrayim which reinforces these essential ideas.

However, this doesn’t quite function as a “commemoration.” Imagine a modern Jew who moved to Poland as if it were any other country, giving no thought to the fact that 90% of Poland’s Jewish population (around 3 million Jews) had been rounded up by the Nazis and murdered. To neglect or forget that tragedy would severely distort our national memory. However, if there were a prohibition against Jews moving back to Poland because of what happened there, it would ensure that we never forget. Similarly, prohibiting Jews from living in Egypt functions as a zeicher l’Yetzias Mitzrayim by preventing a shich’chas Yetzias Mitzrayim (forgetting of the Exodus).

Perhaps this is why we are prohibited from working an eved Ivri with avodas parech or allowing a non-Jew to subject him to avodas parech – not because it is unethical, but because we must not forget the Egyptian slavery in which our entire people were oppressed through avodas parech before Hashem redeemed us.

If this explanation isn’t compelling, here’s another idea. Let’s review the Torah’s presentation:

If your brother becomes impoverished with you and is sold to you, you shall not work him with slave labor. Like a laborer or a resident shall he be with you; until the Jubilee Year shall he work with you. Then he shall leave you, he and his children with him; he shall return to his family, and to his ancestral heritage shall he return. For they are My servants, whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold in the manner of a slave. You shall not subjugate him b’farech – you shall fear your God. (Vayikra 25:39-43)

First, it states a set of laws about the eved Ivri, followed by a statement about Hashem taking us out of Egypt. Only afterwards does it state the prohibition against selling a slave in the manner of a slave and the prohibition against avodas parech. Why does the Torah interpose with a zeicher l’Yetzias Mitzrayim? Abravanel answers:

For they are My servants, whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt – and if so, why should you work him like an eternal slave with humiliating avodas parech? Especially since this constitutes a desecration of My honor, for they are My servants whom I took out from the land of Egypt. Therefore, it is not proper for you to seize them like your slave, [thereby] stealing My servant. Rather, they should be with you like a hired worker or resident, and you shall fear your God, Who lowers [people] and raises them up, and it is possible that you or your offspring will be like this.

Abravanel also maintains that avodas parech is not prohibited because of ethical or justice-related considerations, but for philosophical reasons. We are permitted to use our Jewish brethren as avadim within certain parameters, but if sell them in the manner that other slaves are sold, or work them with avodas parech, then we are acting as though they belong to us, and it is as if we are stealing Hashem’s servants. This is a false idea, as Chazal state: “they are My servants, and not the servants of servants” (Bava Metzia 10a).

In conclusion of this article and series, I’d like to reiterate that my primary objective was not to convince you of any particular answer to our original question. Rather, my goal was to explore three general approaches to such an answer. The double standard of avodas parech for an eved Canaani might stem from the Torah’s overarching strategy with interpersonal mitzvos, in which ethical conduct is inculcated in the nation by in-group legislation with the ultimate goal of universal ethics (Approach #1). Alternatively, the Torah might permit avodas parech of an eved Canaani because avodas parech is only ethically wrong when done to a Jew, due to our national trauma (Approach #2). Or perhaps the prohibition against avodas parech serves a philosophical end, reinforcing our relationship with Hashem as the One Who redeemed us from the Egyptian slavery – an idea unrelated to an eved Canaani (Approach #3). I hope this has been an enlightening exploration!

Now that you’ve read all three approaches, which do you like the best? And if you can think of any more approaches, or find any answers from meforshim, please let me know!

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