Perhaps this article will expose me as a fool, an ignoramus, a haughty dilettante—or all three. But I had to write it, if only to be shown how wrong I am. Either way, we're gonna learn some Shadal!
Well said, Nahum. Whenever I see Shadal challenged, I have to remind myself that I don't necessarily agree with everything he ever said, and yet I feel called upon to at least give the answer that he might have given. So here goes. I'll expand on Nahum's quote from Shadal on דברים ו:ה by citing Shadal's letter to his friend Giuseppe Almeda (excerpted from my translation at https://hakirah.org/Vol%2010%20Klein.pdf):
"True Religion is not the science of divine matters (a science that is too far above the reach of man); it is an intimate belief, a filial devotion, that extends itself in... practices and observances that are determined by law. The goal of such law is not that God may become known and worshipped by us, as if He were in need of our homage, but rather: (1) to keep alive in our minds the idea of God and of Providence, the only idea that is capable of keeping us constantly attached to virtue; and (2) to accustom us to keep a rein on our desires and to undergo privations patiently, an indispensable attitude for rendering us superior to the passions and the temptations of vice.... Jeremiah reposes the glory of humankind in the sound knowledge of God, that is, he says, in the knowledge that God is that Being Whose acts are universal compassion, benevolence, and justice; for these, concludes the prophet—introducing God Himself as the speaker—'these are the things that I desire (that people should do)' (Jer. 9:23).... that is, the knowledge of God is not desired for its own sake; compassion, humanity, and justice are what He desires; it is important to know Him so as to practice the virtues that He loves; 'these are the things that I desire,' says God, not a sterile knowledge of Me."
Note that Shadal, to support his point, is citing the very same pasuk in Jeremiah that Rambam cites in Hilchos Yesodei ha-Torah 1:1 and Moreh 3:54!
As for your question, what does Shadal hold is the value of learning (or engaging in) Torah lishmah?-- I have no direct quote from Shadal on hand, but the best way to understand "Torah lishmah" might be to understand its opposite, "she-lo lishmah." According to Mesillat Yesharim ch. 16 (by the "other" Luzzatto), this means engaging in Torah not "for the sake of divine service,
but rather in order to deceive others and to gain money or honor." In other words, engaging in "Torah lishmah" need not be understood only as a pure intellectual exercise or a search for "truth," but as means of serving Hashem. I thinks Shadal would have endorsed that idea.
I assumed that's how Shadal would interpreted Yirmiyahu 9:23 (which isn't a huge stretch or anything), but it's nice to see a direct quotation!
Interesting idea about Torah lishmah. Definitely helps narrow down his view, but I still feel like I don't have a firm grasp of what that relationship with learning is like as a distinct developmental level. I also need to go back and review what he holds the צלם אלקים is.
In his comments on Gen. 1:26, Shadal says that man *is* “the image of God,” that is, in some aspect he resembles God, Who is Master of all the forces of nature. "How does man resemble God? In my opinion... just as God is Master of all the forces of nature—this being the very meaning of the word Elohim—so man is distinguished from all other creatures in that each one of them has a strength or talent for a single attribute or activity, but only man has the strength and talent for all the attributes and activities in the world."
To build on the Torah lishma part. Even among the rishonim there is a machloket about what “lishma” means and many don’t agree with rambam.
Rashi on Taanit 7a says that it is doing it to fulfill God’s command:
לשמה – משום כאשר צוני ה׳ אלהי ולא כדי להקרות רבי.
And others (IIRC including tosfot) learn that it means learning in order to fulfill the mitzvah
Similarly, there is disagreement about the meaning of “oved miahava” and “oved miyirah” and not everyone agrees with the rambam who views it as the same division as his “lishma” vs. “lo lishma”
Love the study in contrasts—a tale of two cities! Reminds me of this question and first comment: https://judaism.stackexchange.com/q/143986/34188. As you mentioned, Shadal was not into philosophy (or kabbalah), Torah and human felicity for him are about compassion, not the comprehension of objective truth. See, e.g., שד"ל דברים ו':ה'
ואזי אתמה על המתפלספים תמהון גדול, איך לא הבינו כי המכוון בתורה איננו המכוון בפילוסופיאה, כי המכוון בפילוסופיאה הוא הידיעה והכרת האמת, והמכוון בתורה הוא עשיית הטוב והישר; ואם התורה מלמדת אותנו ייחוד האל וחדוש העולם, אין זה למען הקנותנו ידיעת האל והכרת שלימותו כפי מה שהיא באמרם, אך הכל לנטוע בנפשותינו אמונות מועילות להדריכנו במעגלי צדקה ומשפט. (Part of a longer piece -https://mg.alhatorah.org/Parshan/Shadal/Devarim/6.5#m6e2n6 - definitely worth the read!) and שד"ל קהלת – הקדמות
ואני אם אקרֵא שוטה כל ימי לא אירא ולא אֵחת, וכל עוד נפשי בי לא אחדל מקרוא בגרון כי יסוד הנהגת האדם (האיטיקה האמתית) צריך שיהיה לא בקשת הנאתנו וטובתנו, או כבודנו ותפארתנו, אלא בקשת טובת זולתנו, ושההנהגה הזאת איננה נלמדת בשום פילוסופיאה, אלא בספרי ישראל, בתנ"ך ובתלמוד ובמדרשים; ותורת שפינוזה מתנגדת התנגדות שלמה לתורת ישראל, על כן שנאתיה.
As a generalization I think it is fair to say that whereas for Rambam the value in works is to lead one to knowledge for Shadal it is the precise opposite.
Wow, those are some excellent and explicit sources! My exposure to Shadal is primarily through Dan's translations (since that's what I peruse on Shabbos), so I haven't really explored what he's said on Devarim or Koheles. Thank you for sharing!
Looking at the claim of Shadal itself, is this claim true? "Polytheistic beliefs cause the hearts of the various peoples to be sundered, for the members of one nation, who worship a particular god, will despise the members of another nation who worship another god, and they will claim to lack any relationship with them, as if those others were not human beings like themselves."
There were many wars of religion between monotheists who fought others over worshiping the one god in the wrong way. Whether we are talking about Catholics vs. protestants or Jihad (not to mention some of the chashmonaim wars) it seems like monotheism creates the possibility for a certain type of war against others who are demonic for worshiping the wrong god or in the wrong way. A human being who turns their back on their creator (according to the fighter's view of true religion) is outright evil, and not just a foreigner doing their own thing.
Whereas Polytheism, at least in principle, can allow for others to be good human beings while worshiping a different god, since Athena's patronage of Athens is compatible with Apollo's patronage of Sparta and Zeus's patronage of Olympia. Similarly, when an Empire was conquering the near east it didn't need to destroy the other gods, rather they became subservient to the royal pantheon, just like their kings became vassals.
In the case of Persia, they were even willing to support the rebuilding of temples of foreign gods, including our beit hamikdash.
Of course, most wars aren't actually about which god you worship and these exist extensively in both polytheistic and monotheistic cultures, including Jewish civil wars where both sides believed in God. But on the whole, I am not convinced that monotheism doesn't produce greater intolerance than polytheism.
For what it's worth, my friend Yoel Schaper wrote the following on Facebook, similar to what you said:
The egyptologist Jan Assmann takes the opposite stance of Shadal, arguing—most directly in The Price of Monotheism—that monotheism, unlike polytheism, tends to be exclusionary. By dividing religious traditions into "truth" and "error," monotheism, in his view, fosters intolerance and can even lead to militant attitudes. Religious pluralism and tolerance, he argues, are actually more at home in the ancient polytheistic systems. From the perspective of Assmann, shared by many of his colleagues in the ancient history departments, the distinctive feature of Abrahamic monotheism, even in its earliest forms is the focus on the correctness of belief. In that sense, the Torah could almost be called proto-Maimonidean.😄
Because we live in a post-Hellenistic world colored by highly abstract Christian and Islamic systematic theology when we moderns read the Torah it often looks like it is not concerned with correctness of doctrine so we say stuff like 'there is no commandment to belief in Hashem' and 'The Torah says not to worship false gods, it doesn't care if you belief in them'. Yet when approaching the Torah from within its ancient near eastern context you see that it is very much concerned with shaping a counter polytheistic and non-mythic worldview. It doesn't talk in the language of abstract doctrine rather it's language is polemical, teaching by showing. It doesn't say the sun isn't a god, rather it says in Creation it's an object created by Hashem, in the Psalms as a servant of Hashem, in Devarim the functions of all the pagan gods are asssimilated into Hashem (making separate sun-gods, storm-gods, war-gods, wisdom-gods, virility-gods all obsolete). Teaching trough polemical narrative. Which is a common feature of pre-Greek non abstract 'philosophy'. In this sense the sun, moon and stars can be merely inanimate objects in the prose and living praising beings in the poetry. Those verses are not teaching the abstract nature of celestial bodies (if they are living beings or mere objects) they are teaching the absolute sovereignty of Hashem. They teach that there is no pantheon where the sun-god can challenge the creator-god. Like the Borg every divine function is assimilated into Hashem and all of creation falls in line, resistance is futile. There are no divine enemies of Hashem, the only thing thats out of step with His will are humans, and even that is according to His will. These non-abstract verses all are teaching correctness of worldview against polytheism.
Great counterarguments! I guess one would need to reach the type/level of worldwide monotheism promised by the neviim for yemos ha'moshiach, where it seems that there is a direct correlation between the global and lasting peace among humanity and the yedias Hashem that will fill the earth like the waters that cover the seabed. High bar, but perhaps that's what Shadal is referring to.
Great article as usual! There's no question that your approach has strong support from Rambam and other Rishonim, but I think the more interesting and important battleground will be the views of Chazal. Those Rishonim who did push back against Rambam's intellectualized summum bonum highlighted the fact that nowhere do Chazal present a legal obligation of belief. Shadal is on firm ground when he writes in his "Letter to Almeda" that Judaism does not command belief, because it does not attempt to command that which cannot be commanded.
As far as I can tell, Philo of Alexandria is a much more likely source for Rambam's view. After articulating what has been called ""the first creed in history," his emphasis on religious dogma became the direct inheritance of the Church, from which it spread to Muslim theology and then back to his native Judaism. But even Philo presented his focus on beliefs as a means to an end; not the essence of human perfection. On the contrary, retaining a certain ambiguity or skepticism regarding the big questions may actually allow us to live in greater harmony with ourselves, our societies, and even our Creator.
Interesting, do you think it is clear that Chazal are on a different path from Rambam and similar rishonim, or do you think that this issue is a machloket in chazal and both the Rambam and his opponents are building off of different tanaim and amoraim?
I think there were likely tannaim or amoraim who held similar philosophical beliefs to both Rambam and his opponents; Chazal were certainly not a monolith. But I haven't been able to find any sources that Chazal *legislated* those beliefs. This isn't to say that Chazal were indifferent to our beliefs. But I believe they recognized that the Torah's laws and narratives are intended to facilitate an *exploration* of belief, rather than a strict catechism.
Well said, Nahum. Whenever I see Shadal challenged, I have to remind myself that I don't necessarily agree with everything he ever said, and yet I feel called upon to at least give the answer that he might have given. So here goes. I'll expand on Nahum's quote from Shadal on דברים ו:ה by citing Shadal's letter to his friend Giuseppe Almeda (excerpted from my translation at https://hakirah.org/Vol%2010%20Klein.pdf):
"True Religion is not the science of divine matters (a science that is too far above the reach of man); it is an intimate belief, a filial devotion, that extends itself in... practices and observances that are determined by law. The goal of such law is not that God may become known and worshipped by us, as if He were in need of our homage, but rather: (1) to keep alive in our minds the idea of God and of Providence, the only idea that is capable of keeping us constantly attached to virtue; and (2) to accustom us to keep a rein on our desires and to undergo privations patiently, an indispensable attitude for rendering us superior to the passions and the temptations of vice.... Jeremiah reposes the glory of humankind in the sound knowledge of God, that is, he says, in the knowledge that God is that Being Whose acts are universal compassion, benevolence, and justice; for these, concludes the prophet—introducing God Himself as the speaker—'these are the things that I desire (that people should do)' (Jer. 9:23).... that is, the knowledge of God is not desired for its own sake; compassion, humanity, and justice are what He desires; it is important to know Him so as to practice the virtues that He loves; 'these are the things that I desire,' says God, not a sterile knowledge of Me."
Note that Shadal, to support his point, is citing the very same pasuk in Jeremiah that Rambam cites in Hilchos Yesodei ha-Torah 1:1 and Moreh 3:54!
As for your question, what does Shadal hold is the value of learning (or engaging in) Torah lishmah?-- I have no direct quote from Shadal on hand, but the best way to understand "Torah lishmah" might be to understand its opposite, "she-lo lishmah." According to Mesillat Yesharim ch. 16 (by the "other" Luzzatto), this means engaging in Torah not "for the sake of divine service,
but rather in order to deceive others and to gain money or honor." In other words, engaging in "Torah lishmah" need not be understood only as a pure intellectual exercise or a search for "truth," but as means of serving Hashem. I thinks Shadal would have endorsed that idea.
I assumed that's how Shadal would interpreted Yirmiyahu 9:23 (which isn't a huge stretch or anything), but it's nice to see a direct quotation!
Interesting idea about Torah lishmah. Definitely helps narrow down his view, but I still feel like I don't have a firm grasp of what that relationship with learning is like as a distinct developmental level. I also need to go back and review what he holds the צלם אלקים is.
In his comments on Gen. 1:26, Shadal says that man *is* “the image of God,” that is, in some aspect he resembles God, Who is Master of all the forces of nature. "How does man resemble God? In my opinion... just as God is Master of all the forces of nature—this being the very meaning of the word Elohim—so man is distinguished from all other creatures in that each one of them has a strength or talent for a single attribute or activity, but only man has the strength and talent for all the attributes and activities in the world."
To build on the Torah lishma part. Even among the rishonim there is a machloket about what “lishma” means and many don’t agree with rambam.
Rashi on Taanit 7a says that it is doing it to fulfill God’s command:
לשמה – משום כאשר צוני ה׳ אלהי ולא כדי להקרות רבי.
And others (IIRC including tosfot) learn that it means learning in order to fulfill the mitzvah
Similarly, there is disagreement about the meaning of “oved miahava” and “oved miyirah” and not everyone agrees with the rambam who views it as the same division as his “lishma” vs. “lo lishma”
Love the study in contrasts—a tale of two cities! Reminds me of this question and first comment: https://judaism.stackexchange.com/q/143986/34188. As you mentioned, Shadal was not into philosophy (or kabbalah), Torah and human felicity for him are about compassion, not the comprehension of objective truth. See, e.g., שד"ל דברים ו':ה'
ואזי אתמה על המתפלספים תמהון גדול, איך לא הבינו כי המכוון בתורה איננו המכוון בפילוסופיאה, כי המכוון בפילוסופיאה הוא הידיעה והכרת האמת, והמכוון בתורה הוא עשיית הטוב והישר; ואם התורה מלמדת אותנו ייחוד האל וחדוש העולם, אין זה למען הקנותנו ידיעת האל והכרת שלימותו כפי מה שהיא באמרם, אך הכל לנטוע בנפשותינו אמונות מועילות להדריכנו במעגלי צדקה ומשפט. (Part of a longer piece -https://mg.alhatorah.org/Parshan/Shadal/Devarim/6.5#m6e2n6 - definitely worth the read!) and שד"ל קהלת – הקדמות
ואני אם אקרֵא שוטה כל ימי לא אירא ולא אֵחת, וכל עוד נפשי בי לא אחדל מקרוא בגרון כי יסוד הנהגת האדם (האיטיקה האמתית) צריך שיהיה לא בקשת הנאתנו וטובתנו, או כבודנו ותפארתנו, אלא בקשת טובת זולתנו, ושההנהגה הזאת איננה נלמדת בשום פילוסופיאה, אלא בספרי ישראל, בתנ"ך ובתלמוד ובמדרשים; ותורת שפינוזה מתנגדת התנגדות שלמה לתורת ישראל, על כן שנאתיה.
As a generalization I think it is fair to say that whereas for Rambam the value in works is to lead one to knowledge for Shadal it is the precise opposite.
Wow, those are some excellent and explicit sources! My exposure to Shadal is primarily through Dan's translations (since that's what I peruse on Shabbos), so I haven't really explored what he's said on Devarim or Koheles. Thank you for sharing!
Looking at the claim of Shadal itself, is this claim true? "Polytheistic beliefs cause the hearts of the various peoples to be sundered, for the members of one nation, who worship a particular god, will despise the members of another nation who worship another god, and they will claim to lack any relationship with them, as if those others were not human beings like themselves."
There were many wars of religion between monotheists who fought others over worshiping the one god in the wrong way. Whether we are talking about Catholics vs. protestants or Jihad (not to mention some of the chashmonaim wars) it seems like monotheism creates the possibility for a certain type of war against others who are demonic for worshiping the wrong god or in the wrong way. A human being who turns their back on their creator (according to the fighter's view of true religion) is outright evil, and not just a foreigner doing their own thing.
Whereas Polytheism, at least in principle, can allow for others to be good human beings while worshiping a different god, since Athena's patronage of Athens is compatible with Apollo's patronage of Sparta and Zeus's patronage of Olympia. Similarly, when an Empire was conquering the near east it didn't need to destroy the other gods, rather they became subservient to the royal pantheon, just like their kings became vassals.
In the case of Persia, they were even willing to support the rebuilding of temples of foreign gods, including our beit hamikdash.
Of course, most wars aren't actually about which god you worship and these exist extensively in both polytheistic and monotheistic cultures, including Jewish civil wars where both sides believed in God. But on the whole, I am not convinced that monotheism doesn't produce greater intolerance than polytheism.
For what it's worth, my friend Yoel Schaper wrote the following on Facebook, similar to what you said:
The egyptologist Jan Assmann takes the opposite stance of Shadal, arguing—most directly in The Price of Monotheism—that monotheism, unlike polytheism, tends to be exclusionary. By dividing religious traditions into "truth" and "error," monotheism, in his view, fosters intolerance and can even lead to militant attitudes. Religious pluralism and tolerance, he argues, are actually more at home in the ancient polytheistic systems. From the perspective of Assmann, shared by many of his colleagues in the ancient history departments, the distinctive feature of Abrahamic monotheism, even in its earliest forms is the focus on the correctness of belief. In that sense, the Torah could almost be called proto-Maimonidean.😄
Because we live in a post-Hellenistic world colored by highly abstract Christian and Islamic systematic theology when we moderns read the Torah it often looks like it is not concerned with correctness of doctrine so we say stuff like 'there is no commandment to belief in Hashem' and 'The Torah says not to worship false gods, it doesn't care if you belief in them'. Yet when approaching the Torah from within its ancient near eastern context you see that it is very much concerned with shaping a counter polytheistic and non-mythic worldview. It doesn't talk in the language of abstract doctrine rather it's language is polemical, teaching by showing. It doesn't say the sun isn't a god, rather it says in Creation it's an object created by Hashem, in the Psalms as a servant of Hashem, in Devarim the functions of all the pagan gods are asssimilated into Hashem (making separate sun-gods, storm-gods, war-gods, wisdom-gods, virility-gods all obsolete). Teaching trough polemical narrative. Which is a common feature of pre-Greek non abstract 'philosophy'. In this sense the sun, moon and stars can be merely inanimate objects in the prose and living praising beings in the poetry. Those verses are not teaching the abstract nature of celestial bodies (if they are living beings or mere objects) they are teaching the absolute sovereignty of Hashem. They teach that there is no pantheon where the sun-god can challenge the creator-god. Like the Borg every divine function is assimilated into Hashem and all of creation falls in line, resistance is futile. There are no divine enemies of Hashem, the only thing thats out of step with His will are humans, and even that is according to His will. These non-abstract verses all are teaching correctness of worldview against polytheism.
Great counterarguments! I guess one would need to reach the type/level of worldwide monotheism promised by the neviim for yemos ha'moshiach, where it seems that there is a direct correlation between the global and lasting peace among humanity and the yedias Hashem that will fill the earth like the waters that cover the seabed. High bar, but perhaps that's what Shadal is referring to.
Great article as usual! There's no question that your approach has strong support from Rambam and other Rishonim, but I think the more interesting and important battleground will be the views of Chazal. Those Rishonim who did push back against Rambam's intellectualized summum bonum highlighted the fact that nowhere do Chazal present a legal obligation of belief. Shadal is on firm ground when he writes in his "Letter to Almeda" that Judaism does not command belief, because it does not attempt to command that which cannot be commanded.
As far as I can tell, Philo of Alexandria is a much more likely source for Rambam's view. After articulating what has been called ""the first creed in history," his emphasis on religious dogma became the direct inheritance of the Church, from which it spread to Muslim theology and then back to his native Judaism. But even Philo presented his focus on beliefs as a means to an end; not the essence of human perfection. On the contrary, retaining a certain ambiguity or skepticism regarding the big questions may actually allow us to live in greater harmony with ourselves, our societies, and even our Creator.
Interesting, do you think it is clear that Chazal are on a different path from Rambam and similar rishonim, or do you think that this issue is a machloket in chazal and both the Rambam and his opponents are building off of different tanaim and amoraim?
I think there were likely tannaim or amoraim who held similar philosophical beliefs to both Rambam and his opponents; Chazal were certainly not a monolith. But I haven't been able to find any sources that Chazal *legislated* those beliefs. This isn't to say that Chazal were indifferent to our beliefs. But I believe they recognized that the Torah's laws and narratives are intended to facilitate an *exploration* of belief, rather than a strict catechism.